Middle East History & Theory Workshop Conference at University of Chicago

The 33rd Annual Meeting of the Middle East History and Theory (MEHAT) Conference will take place at the University of Chicago on will be held Friday and Saturday, May 4-5, 2018.

This conference, free and open to the public, will feature a keynote address by Dr. James Gelvin (UCLA) and our traditional lamb-roast dinner Saturday night!

To view the schedule of events, click here.

A copy of the conference flyer poster can be downloaded here.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us at mehatconference@gmail.com.

Best regards,

Joseph Cross & Carl Bryant Shook

 

SCHEDULE

Friday, May 4, 2018

“Which Way Forward? Digital Humanities and Middle Eastern Studies”

This round-table discussion features Marlis J. Saleh (Bibliographer for Middle East Studies, University of Chicago Libraries), Miller Prosser (The Oriental Institute, University of Chicago), Oya Topcuoglu (Middle East and North African Studies Program, Northwestern University), and Mohamed El Marzouki (Lewis College of Human Sciences, Illinois Institute of Technology).

4:30pm in Ida Noyes Hall (1212 E. 59th St.)

Reception to follow.

Saturday, May 5, 2018

Registration and all panels take place in Stuart Hall (5835 South Greenwood Ave)

8:00-8:15am                Registration and Coffee

8:15-9:45am                 Session I

Normalizing and Interpreting Destruction in the Late 20th & Early 21st Century Middle East –  Stuart 101

Nicole Beckman (University of Chicago), Discussant

Cat Cleveland (University of Chicago), “Hiroshima in Beirut: Atomic Imagery in Lebanese War Literature 1975-1990.”

Taylor Miller (University of Arizona), “Wayfinding Through the Landswept: The Aesthetics of Homelandscapes and Material Manifestations of Belonging in Jerusalem.”

Hannah Porter (University of Chicago), “‘Screaming in the face of the arrogant’: Understanding the logic and symbolism of Ḥūthī discourse.”

 

Diplomacy and Third-Party Politics in the Early Twentieth Century –  Stuart 102

Sami Sweis (University of Chicago), Discussant

Aram Ghoogasian (University of Chicago), “A Weekend in Cairo: The Beginnings of American Power in Turkey.”

Richard Harrod (Independent Scholar), “Ḥamīd al-Dīn Yemen & The United States in the Early Postwar Period: Engagement & Challenges, 1946 – 1954.”

Erin O’Halloran (St. Anthony’s College, Oxford), “The St James’ Conference on Palestine, 1939: An Indian Dimension.”

The Politics of Early Modern Cultural Production: India, Iran, and the Levant –  Stuart 104

Alexandra Hoffmann (University of Chicago), Discussant

Shaahin Pishbin (University of Chicago), “Poetics of the Imagination: Mīrzā Jalāl Asīr and the ṭarz-i Khayāl.”

Tarek Shamma (Binghamton University), “Bible Translation and Minority Christian Identity in the Nineteenth-Century Levant.”

Darren Wan (University of Chicago), “Learning to Read Persian After the Persianate: The Politics and Poetics of Classicism in Colonial Bombay, 1870–1900.”

 

10:00-11:30am            Session II

Contested Constructs: Post-War Identities and Nationalisms in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin –  Stuart 101

Toygun Altintas (University of Chicago), Discussant

Alexandra Courcoula (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), “The Benaki Art Collection: Conceptions of History and Heritage in Early Twentieth Century Greece.”

Ufuk Erol (Indiana University Bloomington), “A Brief Genealogy of Modern Alevi Historiography.”

Varuzhan Geghamyan (Yerevan State University), “‘Reis R.T.E.’. Personality Cult and Islamic Nationalism in Modern Turkish Poetry.”

Institutions and Ideologies of Education, from Ottoman Cairo to Erdoğan’s Turkey –  Stuart 102

Annie Greene (University of Chicago)Discussant

Derya Doğan (Indiana University Bloomington), “Socio-Political Contexts of Modernization of Islamic Education in the 20th Century.”

Lauren Poulson (University of Chicago), “The Archaeological Project in the Republic of Turkey: From Atatürk to Erdoğan.”

Kyle Wynter-Stoner (University of Chicago), “An Institutional History of Madrasas in 16th and 17th Century Ottoman Cairo.”

Creating and Consuming Culture in the Modern Middle East –  Stuart 104

Rachel Schine (University of Chicago), Discussant

Mohamed Khalil Harb (Harvard University), “Escapism by Design: An Ethnography of Leisure-Consumption Architecture in Beirut.”

Sharon Jacobs (University of Pennsylvania), “Yerba Mate and the Mahjar: Diaspora Influence on Levantine Consumer Culture.”

Asma Mehan (Politecnico di Torino), “Making Heterotopia: Azadi Square as Palimpsest of Political Memory.”

 

11:45am-12:45pm       Lunch

 

1:00-2:30pm               Session III

Men in Love: Masculinity and Madness in Pre-Modern Romances –  Stuart 101

Sam Lasman (University of Chicago), Discussant

Isabel Lachenauer (University of Chicago), “Ḫusrev, Behrām Çūbīn, and Warrior Homosociality in Faḫrī’s Ḫusrev ü Şīrīn.”

Allison Kanner (University of Chicago), “A Pact Between Conflicting Codes:Javānmardī in Niẓāmī’s Laylī o Majnūn.”

Alexandra Hoffmann (University of Chicago), “Manly King or Mad Lover? On the Meaning of Blackness in Fayżī’s Nal o Daman.

Cameron Cross (University of Michigan), “A Dying Man in a Deathless Body: The (Hor)cruxes of Kingship.”

 

Intersections at the Periphery of the Mongol World Empire –  Stuart 102

    Carol Fan (University of Chicago), Discussant

Armen Abkarian (University of Chicago), “’In Bitter and Grievous Times’: Depictions of the Mongol Empire in Armenian Colophons.”

Zachary Schuyler (University of Chicago), “Fall of the Chinggisids: From Golden Family to Figureheads.”

Xinyi Wei (University of Chicago), “Contextualizing the Hui Hui Astronomy Bureau in the Mongol World Empire.”

Zach Winters (University of Chicago), “The Ṣavfat al-Ṣafā and Ṣūfism in the Mongol Era.”

 

Digital Humanities and the Middle East – Stuart 104

Joseph Cross (University of Chicago), Discussant

Matthew Brauer (Northwestern University), “Before Souffles-Anfās: Expanding the Digital Archive of Maghrebi Print Culture to the Nineteenth Century.”

Kathryn Franklin and Anthony Lauricella (Oriental Institute, University of Chicago), “The Best Digitization for Knowledge of the Regions: Mapping Medieval Literary Landscapes Using Quantitative Methods.”

Marko Jovanovic (Institute of Social Sciences), “Digital Humanities and Islamic Manuscript Studies.”

Krishna Kulkarni (University of Chicago), “The Digital Libraries of Afghanistan.”

2:45-4:15pm               Session IV

The End of Life: Implying and Interpellating Communities in Death

–  Stuart 101

Alex Shams (University of Chicago), Discussant

Itamar Toussia Cohen (Tel Aviv University), “‘A Love That Lasts Beyond the Grave’: Animals, Companionship and Death in Muslim Societies.”

Emrah Karakuş (University of Arizona), “The Viral Life: Neoliberal Immunity, AIDS panic, and the Queer Death in Turkey.”

Faraj Hamdan (University of Arizona), “The Role of Mourning Councils (Majalis al-‘Aza) among Iraqi Shi’a Women.”

 

Governing Change: People, Places, and the Law –  Stuart 102

    August Samie (University of Chicago), Discussant

Dilyara Agisheva (Georgetown University), “Colonial Encounter and the Transformation of the Legal System in Crimea in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries.”

Chloe Bordewich (Harvard University), “Disappearing Spaces: Mapping Egypt’s Desert Across the Colonial Divide.”

Henry Clements (Yale University), “Ottoman Bureaucracy and the Birth of the Modern Süryani Community.”

Aysegul Uysal (University of Chicago), “‘Producing “True Muslims’: A Close Examination of the Islamic State’s Governance System.”

 

Broadcasting for Dissent and Control: Media Beyond Censorship – Stuart 104

Thomas Maguire (University of Chicago), Discussant

Sara Farhan (York University), “‘Huna Baghdad’: Competing Visions in Television Programming in Monarchic Iraq.”

Lucy Flamm (University of Texas at Austin), “Combating Curated Memory: Modes of Narration and Pahlavi Iran.”

Andrew Mines (University of Chicago), “Generating State Authority Through Spectacles of Violence: Mapping ISIS’s Video Propaganda Strategy.”

John Perugini (University of Arizona), “Digital Space meets Protest Space: Twitter and 140journos during the Gezi Park Protests.”

 

5:00-6:30pm             Keynote Address

Dr. James Gelvin, UCLA

“Theorizing Nationalism in the Arab Middle East: A Personal Story”

Ida Noyes Hall (1212 E. 59th St.)

6:30-8:00pm            Traditional lamb-roast dinner

This dinner, free and open to all conference participants, is made possible by the Middle Eastern Studies’ Students Association (MESSA), University of Chicago.

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Does the Sunni-Shiite Construct Really Help Explain Electoral Politics in MENA?

 

How many of you feel that using the “Sunni-Shiite” construct better frames political discussions in the MENA region?  Does the Sunni-Shiite Construct Really Help Explain Electoral Politics in MENA?

The irrelevance of American rhetoric in recent weeks should, but won’t, put to rest the mythology of 2009, namely that by speaking out Obama would somehow have changed the outcome.~United States political science scholar, Marc Lynch, Director of Middle East Political Science Project at George Washington University // Tweets as @AbuAardvark

Case in Point: We still have trouble reviewing political elections through the construct of “Sunni-Shiite” and “Secularists versus Islamist” politics, as many North American and predominantly Anglo-Saxon scholars continue to do.  Such binary labeling leaves little room for moderates to assume a role… but maybe that’s the point of this constant practice of labeling.  For example, Thomas Friedman has made millions in booksales with his Sunni-Shiite obsession–I mean framework.  Kind of in the same vein, Kirk Sowell uses this framework to review Iraq’s 2018 elections.  However, he identifies Sunnis and Shiites as vested interest groups who shift to form coalitions.  So perhaps all is not lost through this persistent analysis of Sunni versus Shite political organizing strategy.

But, we digress from our main point: socio-economic grievances drove social movements, which led to protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and in a non-Arab uprising in Iran.

Better-organized and disciplined movements are more capable of sustaining nonviolent campaigns over time. The leaderless Iranian protests seem more likely to be open to escalation on the ground, regardless of any strategic decisions. The more protesters use violence, the easier it will be for the regime to justify unleashing its repressive machinery.~Source: Washington Post, Marc Lynch, Director of Middle East Political Science Project at George Washington University // Tweets as @AbuAardvark

There’s much more to follow up regarding the hopes and expectations of Iraqi’s in their elections process, Iranians and Tunisians in their organized protests, and the interplay of Arab Gulf countries providing arms to different parties in Syria and Yemen.  But to be honest: given the dramatic social movements (Women’s March, Tea Party, Ultra-Nationalism/Populism, Our Revolution, #MeToo, #EnoughisEnough) that have developed within the United States, our home, we are hard pressed to conjecture or analyze what is occurring in the MENA region.  Since the current U.S. president has done the following:

  • Called for reimposing sanctions on Iran (but not Russia);
  • Defied international conventions and recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel while disregarding peace group efforts among Jews, Arab Christians, Arab Muslims, and Armenians;
  • Threatened to attack Iran, then Pakistan–then withhold aid– with intermittent bombardment of Yemen–triple the number from 2016;
  • Bombarded Syria with 59 Tomahawk missiles –in a 180 degree turn from President Obama;
  • Danced around with Arab Gulf leaders (literally) while preaching about building-bridges…here’s the video:

The current U.S. President has bombed the Middle East & North Africa region more than his predecessor.  All in the name of defeating ISIL sprinkled with Islolationism/”America First” and over White Nationalistic tendencies.  And it’s only been one year for him.

So as we at PITAPOLICY continue to apologize for his poor decision-making, which is costing civilian lives overseas, please know that we are following your social movements and inspiring startup stories .(See HALA Systems and how they use technology to develop a tool that facilitate humanitarian assistance in Syria.  They received investment from a social venture capital fund called The Impact Engine.) .  We still believe that developing social capital in the MENA region is the only tool to endure and prevent conflict.

And, yes, in addition to following, we are also praying that the social movements pitaconsumers are developing–or reforming and questioning and revising–moves your respective countries’ institutions in the direction that your citizens feel best. Because the U.S. does not know better.  We truly feel that the Sunni-Shiite divide is a pretext to create division and deride social institutions.   Nor have we demonstrated it via our current president.  Please keep tweeting us your experiences in the MENA region.  We’re listening… and learning.  We promise that we’ll return to bi-weekly blogging on the political economy and business news.  #Godspeed

 

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Turkish Investment Authority Presents a Case for the US to Invest in Turkey

This week, in the United States, felt very much like what many children would have described as “Opposite Day”.  Here’s why: The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the President of the United States’ “Muslim Travel Ban”, which is already reinforcing an unwelcoming message to those in the MENA region who wish to do business or study in the U.S.  This unprecedented travel ban proposed by the current U.S. Administration compounds the difficulty in traveling–meaning business travelers

Good news:  Thankfully, Turkey has resumed processing visa applications for American citizens traveling to Turkey for business and tourism.  Coincidentally, last month, the Turkish Investment Authority provided an in-depth presentation about U.S.-Turkish trade relations.  Below are the highlights from their presentation to University of Chicago’s Booth Business students and alumni.

Turkey’s Economic Health Post Global Financial Crisis

It’s funny: Just how the U.S. is imposing travel restrictions while Turkey is proceeding in the opposite direction by lifting restrictions, Turkey’s economy went in the opposite direction of the U.S. when the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 hit.

Currently, Turkey boasts the 13th largest economy in the world.  In 2016, Turkey produced 2 trillion dollars in GDP as it grew 5.6 percent in average annual GDP growth, each year since 2o03.  Turkey grew higher than neighboring Hungary (1.1%), Romania (3.5%), and Poland (3.8%).  Given the 2008 Financial Crisis that severely hit European Union (EU) countries, like Iceland and Greece, Turkey remained resilient.

Rather, Turkey tripled its income per capita: increasing from $3,581 in 2002 to $10,883 in 2016.  As a result, Turkey’s about 20 million from the lower class (those earning annual income between $5,000 to $10,000) expanded the middle class from 17.8 million to 40 million.  Turkey touts these accomplishments since only seven other countries, with populations of 50 million or more, have exceeded $10,000 in income per capita.  The growth of disposable income among Turkey’s middle class shows almost 250 percent growth in automobile ownership between 2002 to 2016.

Check out the Turkish Investment Authority’s site for more data points on Turkey’s economic statistics and timeline of major labor, investment, and tax reforms.

Bad News

However, two challenges facing Turkey’s economy are: 1) low current account deficit; and 2) low savings.  Note: The Turkish lira has fallen more than 10 percent against the dollar and euro in the past three months alone.  Inflation stands at 11.9 percent–the highest in nine years.

Good News

Turkey entered into a Customs Union with the EU and Free Trade Agreements with 27 countries as it provides access to the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) markets.  Due to these market access points, Turkey is the production base for the Nestle company’s sales to MENA.  Because Turkey is a production center for leather, clothing, and textiles, the Hugo Boss company’s largest production facility is in Turkey.   Now, Tesla is considering installing chargers in Turkey as the middle-income country is getting ready to produce its first domestic car.

Economic Growth Encourages More Dialogue

Finally, despite Turkey’s wish to increase economic ties with the United States and encourage US investment, Turkey’s leadership remains steadfast in asserting certain principles–specifically: discouraging the US from breaking from global norms and officially recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  According to Turkish Spokesman to President Erdogan, “such a move would undermine all peace efforts and trigger new tensions and conflicts.

But there are also political-economic developments on the U.S.-Turkish front.  Turkey is also following the U.S. trial of Turkish banker, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, who is accused of helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions and flood the currency market with Irani oil revenue.  As the case continues in the U.S. judicial system, we see how the accused’s bank, Halbank, is restating its transparency policies:

 [Halkbank] strictly adheres to national and international regulations” in all businesses and transactions.~Halkbank Statement

Whatever the verdict will be for Mehmet, it may be more interesting to see how other Turkish banks respond in order to safeguard Turkey’s investment climate.  Dialogue between the U.S. and Turkey is there, but the impetus for increased economic ties depends on the President Erdogan’s response to ’45’.

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Will Saudi Ouster Increase Confidence for the Investor?

“I think as an investor I would want to make sure that I’m investing in a country where my corporate investment, my business is protected through some type of rule of law…I don’t think that’s there.”~Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Obama-Biden administration, Joseph Westphal on CNBC’s “Squawk Box”

On the business climate and investment note, we invite you to fill out a short 5-minute survey that seeks your input on what you consider important for investing into emerging and advanced economies:  PITAPOLICY Team Survey Link

Saudi 2030 Vision

Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman (MBS) ordered 11 Saudi princes to be arrested for charges of corruption while freezing 1,700 of their bank accounts.  This happened days after U.S.. Special Middle East Envoy, and POTUS 45’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, made a third announced visit to Saudi Arabia.  Consequently, we had to hear a series of justifications from an acquaintance who used to live in Saudi Arabia to explain why Saudi Arabia’s upheaval towards reform.  Our acquaintance–as well as a series of Anglo men, based in the United States, argued that–rightly or wrongly–these political moves may help Saudi Arabia achieve a stronger, healthier business environment and remove bureaucratic hurdles to implement the Saudi 2030 Vision.  Saudi Economic & Planning Minister, Prince Adel Faqi, is the visionary behind 2030 Plan.  MBS’s purge resulted in Faqi’s removal too.  Their “Game of Thrones” conjectures emphasized the drama behind two unexplained deaths of princes.

We tried rebutting the argument that clampdown on corruption necessitated a purge.  In fact, the irony in instigating a reform included more autocratic measures implemented by one-single authority: the Crown Prince.  This almost reminded us of Egypt’s General Al-Sisi deposing the elected president, Muhammad Morsi, to help restore “rule of law” and stability.  (Yes, the terms “rule of law” and “corruption” are now part of authoritarian leaders’ vocabulary as a means of consolidating power.)  Does MBS possess the political clout to carry out the 2030 economic plans internally?  Has his power consolidation left him fewer stakeholders to successfully implement reforms?

Factor? ARAMCO’S Initial Public Offering

For 2018, Saudi Arabian Oil Company, Saudi Aramco, is considering selling 5% of its company to non Saudi investors –a landmark business move on the heels of the landmark political move that just transpired this past weekend.  According to Fortune magazine: Saudi Arabia claims that it has oil reserves in the range of “13 times as large as the oil reserves of Exxon Mobil, the biggest independent oil company in the world”.  Moreover, in October, Saudi Arabia hosted a Future Investment Initiative conference that drew financial sector bigwigs to Riyadh.

  • Did the planned Initial Public Offering (IPO) influence the sudden fight against corruption?
  • Where will the confluence of business interests draw a line in the sand?
  • Will Saudi political culture continue to begin and end with the Crown Prince?

Under the authority of his father King Salman, the young prince, Muhammed bin Salman (MBS) assumed leadership roles, including.  Meanwhile, Lebanon’s Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, suddenly resigned after a visit to Riyadh.  He announced his resignation over Arabiya, the Saudi-owned media channel.

Saudi Ouster Appeases Investor?
Was the Saudi ouster a genuine attempt at improving the investment environment by cracking down on corruption?  Just because the Kingdom has seen a purge of high officials does not mean that the culture of corruption has been been purged.

As Saudi journalist, Jamal Khasoggi commented on MBS’s “small motion for reform” in a Wilson Center forum, we are seeing a shift from ‘fanatic extremism’ to fanatic fascism’.  Khashoggi stated that he received a text message by Prince Al Waleed, who is the wealthiest among Saudi business community and ‘liberal-ish’ –if not the most liberal among princes, who funded Georgetown University’s Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding.  In fact, Al-Waleed was supportive of MSB. But he is rumored to have refused investing in a particular project, which may have led to his house arrest for alleged corruption charges.

As a result, any investor would need to exercise caution in private sector.

Sidenotes

  • Do not forget the current Saudi crisis with Qatar.
  • Prince Adel Jubeir continues to serve as the senior most foreign policy official in the Kingdom.  Both he and MBS may both be paralyzed by paranoia of political islam.

Prince Adel Jubeir continues to serve as the senior most foreign policy official in the Kingdom.  Both he and MBS may both be paralyzed by paranoia of political islam.

 

 

 

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Navigating MENA Markets with CAReem! #YallaCareem

When your competitor outspends you, your business model must be creative at the local level. ~ Abdulla Elyas, Co-Founder of Careem

 

When Saudi Arabia first announced that Saudi women could start driving in 2018, we initially thought: awesome for Saudi women; not so great for the ride-sharing industry within Saudi Arabia.   Specifically, Careem is the ride-sharing business model that beat Uber to the Middle East & North Africa location and filled a gap of public transportation and accurate delivery while generating thousands of jobs.  Instead, this was the response by one of Careem’s co-founders:

Now we can train and employ women drivers in Saudi Arabia.~Abdulla Elyas, Co-founder of Careem

Careem’s response imagined a long-term future that goes beyond the bottom line.   Elyas and his partners were on to something: 8 out of 10 Saudi women want to drive, according to Newsweek.  10 days after King Salman bin Abdelaziz Al Saud’s announcement, Saudi women filled up a Careem training class.

Maybe that’s why Careem attracted another round of funding from a Chinese based investor, Didi: Careem does not shy away from competition.  For being creative in a competitive industry, and operating in a dynamic region, The University of Chicago’s Rustandy Center for Social Sector Innovation invited Careem Co-Founder, Abdullah Elyas, to discuss his technology background’s influence on ride-sharing industry– and wider entrepreneurship ecosystem– that stretches from Morocco to Pakistan.  Recently, Careem became the first ride-sharing/courier service in Palestine–Ramallah, specifically, which will hire locally in an area that faces at least 20 percent unemployment.

Careem successfully competed at different stages of funding to obtain Mideast investments–intra-regional capital injection signals confidence in local markets– from Wamda Capital, Arzan Venture Capital (Kuwait-based), Lumia Capital, El Sewedy Investments, as well as foreign firms, like Daimler and the technology focused investment group, Coatue.

Technology Side

“Make a left after the monument, then a little to the right…then…oops we’re lost and the house number does not follow a sequence,” sums up a variety of personal driving adventures in the MENA region.  We cannot count the number of times we have driven through Beirut, Jordan, Dubai and in Pakistan where our handheld map, or mispronounced landmark, could not get us directly to our destinations.  Sometimes it took a miracle to arrive at a new location when the term “address” did not register on a map.

In the 21st century, miracle may translate as a “timely app” that makes sense of the urban “non planning” in many of these countries.  In 2014, Elyas developed a cloud-based application, Enwani, which transformed Careem’s business venture into an precision-oriented ride-sharing experience.  Elywas also transformed from tech guy, to Chief People Officer, as he joins Mudassir Sheikha, Chief Executive Officer, and Magnus Olsen as Chief “Xperience” Officer to focus on the customer driven experience.  Now, Careem is the fastest growing technology company in the MENA region with projected 30% monthly growth.

Branding Careem

Another way of looking at this expanding $1.2 Billion enterprise is the branding aspect born out of Careem’s core values.  As Elyas said, you find the word “car” in Careem–and in Arabic, Kareem means “generosity”.  The co-founder explained that the pricing model offers a fair price to the rider and generous wage to the Careem driver, or ‘captain’, and an opportunity to donate to local causes, like the Refugee crisis.

On the Corporate Social Responsibility side of Careem, they recognize that their environment includes an influx of refugees in many of the countries Careem operates in daily.  Therefore, they partnered with the United National Refugee Agency to include a ‘Donate’ option via the Careem application while booking a rideshare.  Yalla, there you have it: Careem.   Or as one of their viral marketing campaigns says #BeCareem!

Speaking of branding, check out how Careem literally LAUNCHED their logo and concept into the MENA market beyond their Dubai rooftop:

Careem’s creative campaign in several emerging markets earned them over 5 million views and turned the voyeur into customer in over 80 cities, including Istanbul at the beginning of this year.

With Careem’s success, Elyas generously shared some tips for rising entrepreneurs:

  • Recognize that your business centers around a people culture, so don’t be shy in assigning a high level management position that focuses on people.  For example, he serves as Chief People Officer
  • Work with investors that share your business model’s values.
  • Disrupt the industry, NOT the regulator!

Stray Observation: Careem has already installed child/baby car seats for safety sake.  This observation and the last tip brings us to our question: Does Careem feel bold enough to disrupt the driving culture a little more by pressuring the regulator to enforce safer driving conditions?  😉

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When Special Envoys Get Dumped, Issues and MENA Region Get Drumpfed

“Rex Tillerson outlines a major State Department reform that promotes business, war on Islamic State, while downplaying African peacemaking and outreach to Muslim world,” writes Colum Lynch for the Foreign Policy magazine.  The 45th administration argues that this will achieve a 30 percent reduction in the State Department’s budget.  However, this will also send a message about U.S. priorities to the global village–not just the countries affected, which are mostly outside of the G-20 circle.

In effect, the Tru mp administration has disrupted the Middle East & North Africa region diplomatically by removing senior envoy positions at the U.S. Department of State, which one would hope, will not further disrupt the region politically and economically.

Wait–remember the Qatar kerfuffle earlier this summer when Tr ump intervened in a Russia-UAE accusation of terror activities by Qatar?  And it turned out that his staff had secret meetings with both Russia and the UAE prior to his election win?

Here’s a listing of positions the 45th U.S. administration has removed or demoted in status by folding the responsibilities within a larger regional department.  PITAPOLICY itemized them from Secretary Tillerson’s memo to senior ranking Senator Bob Corkor.  (The full memo is pasted below for your review.)  Note the country locations and issue areas that will no longer receive specific attention, but the positions for “Special Advisor for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations” and “Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.” remain.  Decide for yourself if Lynch’s conclusions are mostly correct.

  • Senior Advisor for MEK Resettlement

  • Special Coordinator for Libya
  • Coordinator for Cybersecurity Issues
  • U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

    as well as the U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities

  • U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (Note: the U.S. still maintains troops in Afghanistan)
  • Senior Advisor for Secretary Initiatives
  • Senior Coordinator for International InformationTechnology Diplomacy
  • Special Envoy to Syria/Senior Advisor on Partner Engagement for Syria’s Foreign Fighters
  • Special Advisor on Youth Global Issues
  • Lead Coordinator on Iran Nuclear Implementation
  • U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change

  • U.S. Special Representative for International Labor Affairs
  • U.S. Special Advisor for International Disabilities Rights
  • Special Envoy to the South Sudan

As a result of these cuts, Tillerson argues that the U.S. taxpayers will be saved 10 billion dollars over the next five years.  But at what cost?

Letter to Senate from U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson 

The Honorable

Bob Corker, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with my commitment to Congress, I alert you to and seek your feedback on steps we are considering to improve the ability of the U.S. Department of State and USAID to achieve critical foreign policy goals that are currently the responsibility of special envoys or special representatives.

Over the past four decades of U.S. diplomacy, Congress and the President have utilized these positions to assert U.S. leadership abroad and address emerging challenges. A few examples include mediating peace in Northern Ireland, restoring full diplomatic relations with Burma, addressing threats to global health, and serving as representatives to international organizations. Today, nearly seventy such positions exist within the State Department, even after many of the underlying policy challenges these positions were created to address have been resolved.

I believe that the Department will be able to better execute its mission by integrating certain envoys and special representative offices within the regional and functional bureaus, and eliminating those that have accomplished or outlived their original purpose. In some cases, the State Department would leave in place several positions and offices, while in other cases, positions and offices would be either consolidated or integrated with the most appropriate bureau. If an issue no longer requires a special envoy or representative, then an appropriate bureau will manage any legacy responsibilities.

This integration will address concerns that under the current structure, a special envoy or representative can circumvent the regional and functional bureaus that make up the core of the State Department. In each case, the allocated budget, staff members, and responsibilities would be reallocated to the appropriate bureau. Issues that require high-level interaction with senior foreign officials will be assigned to a senior official to whom authority is delegated to conduct such diplomacy.

In addition, this integration would also eliminate redundancies that dilute the ability of a bureau to deliver on its primary functions. Empowering regional and functional bureaus will make knowledge and resources more accessible, provide clarity in reporting authority, strengthen

communication channels, and create a more efficient State Department. The goal of restructuring these offices is to ensure that each policy priority efficiently aligns with the resources housed in the regional and functional bureaus. In this regard, I have determined that the changes proposed will advance U.S. national security interests, and will help to counter the influence of U.S. adversaries and competitors.

Pursuant to section 7015(a) and 7034(l) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (Div. J, P.L. 115-31), the Department is notifying and reporting to the Committees on certain organizational changes related to special envoys and

related positions. Additionally, I have also reported on changes to special envoys and related positions that do not require notification to the Committees.

I look forward to working with you to make the State Department and USAID better equipped to address the foreign policy challenges of the United States.

Sincerely,

Rex W. Tillerson Secretary of State

In accordance with section 7015(a) and 7034(l) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (Div. J, P.L. 115-31), the Department is notifying and reporting to the Committees on certain organizational changes related to special envoys and related positions. Personnel and funding levels are based on full-year allocations for FY 2017.

The following ambassador-at-large and special envoy positions will be retained and organized within the appropriate bureau or Under Secretary:

The Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues will continue to be an ambassador- level position confirmed by the U.S. Senate, which will report to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J), where it will continue to promote the rights and empowerment of women and girls through U.S. foreign policy. This will involve realigning 28 positions and $5,326,000 in support costs within Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) from the Office of the Secretary to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J).

The U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism will be retained and the office returned to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) where the Special Envoy can be assisted by the entire team of experts in the bureau. This will involve realigning 2 positions and $130,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

The Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs will be retained and report to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J), where it will continue to lead and coordinate the U.S. government’s diplomatic engagement on hostage-related matters. This will involve realigning 5 positions and $505,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J).


The following ambassador-at-large and special envoy positions will be retained and expanded:

The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (IRF) will continue to be an ambassador-level position confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and will be organized under and report to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J). Additionally, IRF will assume the functions and staff of the U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs, U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities, U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia.

For the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central Asia this will involve the realignment of 1 position and $139,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (IRF).

For the U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs this will involve removing the title and realigning 10 positions and $1,303,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (IRF).

For the U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities this will involve removing the title and realigning 4 positions and $163,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (IRF).

For the U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation this will involve removing the title and realigning 1 position and $153,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom (IRF).

The Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator of U.S. Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally (S/GAC) will continue to be an ambassador-level position confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and continue to perform the functions of the U.S. Special Representative for Global Health Policy (S/GHP). We intend to request that Congress amend the statute to expand the title to include both positions to reflect a more comprehensive approach to global health. There are no resource implications for this change.

Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues (SEHI) will be retained and continue to be organized within the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). SEHI will assume the functions, which include providing policy advice on Holocaust issues, and staff of the Special Adviser for Holocaust Issues. There are no resource implications for this change.

The following special envoy, special coordinator, and special representative titles will be retained, dual hatted with an existing position, and organized appropriately within the appropriate bureau:

The Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) will be dual hatted as the Special Representative for Environment and Water Resources. One position and $226,000 in support costs will be reprogrammed within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Oceans International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES).

The Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues will continue to be dual hatted with the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J) who will promote substantive dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama. There are no resource implications for this change.

The Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights (J) will be dual hatted with the title and functions and assume the staff of the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues. The Under Secretary is responsible for the human rights portfolio, including the publication of the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. This will involve the realignment of 1 position and $224,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J).


The following special envoy function will be transferred to USAID:

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will assume the functions and staff of the Office of Global Food Security (GFS). This change will eliminate duplicative work and further empower USAID to continue to advance global food security effectively. The Department will seek to realign GFS resources to USAID in future budget requests.

The following special envoy, special representative, special advisor, and coordinator titles will be removed and the functions performed by the appropriate bureaus:

The following titles will be removed and the functions and staff assumed by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL):

U.S. Special Advisor for International Disabilities Rights. Functions include leading the comprehensive strategy to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities internationally. This will involve realigning 3 positions and $445,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

U.S. Special Representative for International Labor Affairs. Functions include furthering U.S. foreign policy goals related to human rights, democracy promotion, trade, and sustainable growth. This will involve realigning 1 position and $186,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

The titles for following positions will be removed and the functions and staff assumed by the Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs (OES):

U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change. Functions include engaging partners and allies around the world on climate change issues. This will involve realigning 7 positions and $761,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs (OES).

U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic Region. Functions include advancing U.S. interests in the Arctic. This will involve realigning 5 positions and $438,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs (OES).

The titles for following positions will be removed and the functions and staff assumed by the Bureau of African Affairs (AF):

U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa & Democratic Republic of Congo. The Special Envoy position currently is organized in AF, however the authorized staff positions and associated funding are currently in the Office of the Secretary and will be reprogrammed to AF. This will involve realigning 4 positions and $957,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of African Affairs (AF).

U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. This will involve realigning 6 positions and $4,408,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of African Affairs (AF). We intend to request that Congress repeal the statutory provision for this special envoy position, since a deputy assistant secretary in AF already fulfills the responsibilities.

The titles for following positions will be removed and the functions and staff assumed by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP):

U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. We intend to request that Congress repeal of the statutory requirement for this special representative position, since the mission of this position has been accomplished with the 2016 formation of a democratically elected, civilian-led government and the rebuilding of relations with Burma. Any legacy and future responsibilities will be addressed by EAP. This will involve realigning 1 position and $224,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP).

The titles for following positions will be removed and the functions and staff assumed by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA):

The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will assign the functions of the Special Coordinator for Libya and Senior Advisor for MEK Resettlement (SCL) to a deputy assistant secretary. The title will be removed and 2 positions and $379,000 in support costs will remain in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA).

The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will retain the functions of the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria. The title will be removed and the functions continue to be performed by a deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA). The title will be removed and 2 positions and $379,000 in support costs will remain in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA).

The titles for following positions will be removed and the functions and staff assumed by the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs (EB):

U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy. The functions, which include the formulation, coordination, and oversight of policy related to information and communication technology, will be assigned to a deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs (EB). There are no resource implications in this change because they are staying within EB.

Senior Coordinator for International Information Technology Diplomacy. Functions include coordinating with responsible departments and agencies on foreign policy efforts related to international information technology infrastructure and internet issues. There is currently no position nor support cost for the Senior Coordinator for International Information Technology Diplomacy. The functions will transfer from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs (EB).

Coordinator for Cyber Issues (CCI). Functions encompass advancing the full range of U.S. interests in cyberspace including security, economic issues, freedom of expression, and free flow of information on the internet. This will involve realigning 23 positions and $5,497,000 in support costs from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs (EB).

Special Advisor for Conflict Diamonds. Functions will continue to be performed by a deputy assistant secretary in the Economic & Business Affairs Bureau (EB). There are no resource implications for this change.

The European and Eurasian Affairs Bureau (EUR) will retain the staff and functions of the Senior Representative to Minsk Group. The title will be removed and the functions will continue to be performed by a deputy assistant secretary in the European and Eurasian Affairs Bureau (EUR). One position and $182,000 in support costs will remain in the European and Eurasian Affairs Bureau (EUR).

The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) will retain the functions and staff of the Special Coordinator for Haiti. The title will be removed and 9 positions and $656,000 in support costs will remain in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA).

The Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff (S/P) will assume the functions and staff of the Coordinator for Sanctions Policy (CSP). S/P will coordinate a comprehensive sanctions policy. This will involve removing the title and realigning 7 positions and $831,000 in support costs within the Office of the Secretary’s D&CP allocation from the CSP office to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff (S/P).

The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) will assume the functions and staff of the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and coordinate across the government to meet U.S. strategic goals in the region. This will involve removing the title and sustaining the realignment of 9 positions and $1,985,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). Given the Administration’s recent South Asia policy announcement, the Secretary will consider options regarding diplomatic responsibilities in the region as needed.

The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) retain the functions and staff of the Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters. The title will be removed and functions continued to be performed by a deputy assistant secretary. There are no funding implications for this change.

The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) will assume functions and staff of the Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation, including ensuring that the nuclear steps to which Iran committed in the JCPOA are fully implemented and verified. This will involve removing the title and realigning 5 positions and $1,208,000 in support costs from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN).

The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI) will assume the functions and staff of the U.S. Special Representative for Global Partnerships. M/PRI will continue to strengthen and deepen U.S. diplomacy and development around the world through partnerships that leverage the creativity, innovation, and core business resources of partners for greater impact. This will involve removing the title and realigning 14 positions and $443,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary and the Bureau of the Comptroller and General Financial Services to the Office of the Under Secretary for Management.

The Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources (ENR) will continue to perform the responsibilities of the Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs. We intend to request that Congress repeal the statutory requirement for this coordinator position, since the Assistant Secretary already fulfills the responsibilities.

The following special envoy, special representative, special advisor, coordinator, and related positions will be removed or retired:

The Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks position will be removed, as the talks ceased in 2008. One position and $224,000 in support costs will be realigned within the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (EAP).

The Transparency Coordinator position will be removed. Legacy or future responsibilities will be addressed by the Under Secretary for Management (M). Three positions and $165,000 in support costs within the D&CP will be reprogrammed from the Office of the Secretary to the Under Secretary for Management (M).

The Special Advisor for Global Youth Issues position will be removed. The portfolio of helping the U.S. Government engage young people internationally falls within the scope of the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R). There is no support cost for this position.

The Special Envoy for the Colombian Peace Process position will be removed and the functions assumed by the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau (WHA). There is no position established for this special envoy, and $5,000 in support costs within D&CP will be reprogrammed from the Office of the Secretary to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA).

The Personal Representative for Northern Ireland Issues position will be retired. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement has been implemented with a devolved national assembly in Belfast now in place. Legacy and future responsibilities will be assigned to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). This will involve realigning $50,000 in support costs within the Bureau

of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR).

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Special Representative position will be removed. The State Department is undergoing an updated review process under the Presidential Executive Order on reorganizing the executive branch. This will involve realigning 8 positions and $1,247,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to the Under Secretary for Management (M).

The U.S. Special Envoy for the Closure of Guantanamo Detention Facility position will be removed. Any legacy and future responsibilities will be assigned to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA). This will involve realigning 9 positions and $637,000 in support costs within D&CP from the Office of the Secretary to Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA).

The Special Adviser for Secretary Initiatives position will be removed. There is no staff currently authorized for this position. This will involve reprogramming $43,000 in support costs.

The Senior Advisor to the Secretary position will be removed. This will involve reprogramming 4 positions and $350,000 in support costs from the Office of the Secretary to Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff (S/P).

Finally, the Department also informs the Committees that the Department does not intend at this time to make any organizational changes to the following offices:

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the Office of the Secretary:

• Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the office of Under

Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (J):

• Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism
• Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice
• Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL):

• Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons will continue to be held by a deputy assistant secretary.

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN):

• Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs
• Special Negotiator for Plutonium Disposition
• Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR):

• Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia • Special Representative to OSCE

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T):

• Permanent Representative for Conference on Disarmament
• Special Representative for Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

Issues

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the office of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and Environment (E):

• Chief Economist
• Science and Technology Adviser

The following positions will be retained and continue to be organized under the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA):

• Israel and the Palestinian Authority, U.S. Security Coordinator
• Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. This positionwill be reassessed as ISIS becomes more of a diffused threat.

The following position will be retained and continue to be organized under the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP):

• Special Representative for North Korea Policy. This position will be reassessed as North Korea policy advances.

The following position will be retained and continue to be organized under the Consular Affairs Bureau (CA):

• Special Advisor for Children’s Issues
The following position will be retained and continue to be organized under the office of the

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R):

• Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center
The following position will be retained and continue to be organized under the Bureau of

Economic & Business Affairs (EB):

• Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs

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PITAPOLICY Joins Polsky Exchange Because #Startup Ecosystems Overlap

PITAPOLICY, LLC is excited to enlist as a member of the Polsky Exchange, the startup ecosystem facilitated by the Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation at the University of Chicago in Hyde Park, Illinois.  Polsky is not just a co-working space, but it is a full-fledged turnkey operation for serious entrepreneurs at different stages of development:

  • Polsky Small Business Growth Program
  • Polsky Incubator (think of early-stage–solid concept, but ready for mentorship)
  • Fab Lab (think of ‘mockup stage’ in product development)
  • UChicago Startup Investment Program (laddering from the successful business class ‘proof of concept’ project and needs acceleration)

The Polsky community’s epicenter may be the Chicago area, but, startup ecosystems overlap because of their impact on their product/service delivery if it makes it easier/more accessible to their consumers.  When they overlap, their local influence broadens across markets, and perhaps, carries into training, hiring, and fostering communities in different spaces.  The two MENA examples of impact come from the Polsky Center.  However, let’s not forget the regional examples of startup support that are homegrown in the pita-consuming region.

MENA Startup Ecosystems

The Middle East & North Africa region has a few startup hubs that encourage the startup community–especially in Information Communication Technology sector.  Just look at Flat6Labs Accelerator, which originated in Egypt, but provides entrepreneurship advisory and funding (Sawari Ventures) to jumpstart startup ideas into commercialization from the MENA region.  The MENA incubator supports ilboursa:

 ilboursa.com is Tunisia’s first stock exchange news website. Founder Ismail Ben Sassi started the company with the intention of offering data to help investors in Tunisia make better financial decisions. The site is one of the most visited online sites in the country, averaging 80,000 visitors a month.~TechCrunch

Five years later, ilboursa has grown to provide business intelligence for those looking to invest in Tunisia.  In the bigger regional picture, with the Flat6Labs success, they may propel Tunisian startups to compete with Lebanon and Egypt to lead MENA’s entrepreneurial activity.  It’s definitely a competition to observe– like a close futball tournament.

Then there is Oasis500, which is another example of an incubator-accelerator hub for advisory and funding in MENA hub for early and mid-stage startups.  Startup Rising by Chris Schroeder describes many of the early startups that experienced success in the pita-consuming countries following the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya… but not so much in Bahrain, Yemen, or Syria.

Example 1: Fetchr

Fetchr, co-founded by University of Chicago Booth Business School alumnus, Idris Al-Rifai, offers a logistics godsend for those trying to deliver packages in the Middle East & North Africa region.  Although Fetchr was not a Polsky member, Fetchr serves as a success story for other University of Chicago entrepreneurs in the making who come from the MENA region.  Why? The UAE-based company, and co-founder, represents the FIRST early stage MENA applicant to qualify and receive U.S. venture capital funding as reported by FORBES.

As business graduates and mentors continuously say: networks matter. Networks matter in the startup ecosystem when a positive “disruptive” idea for the economy and society needs an injection of funding to fuel the technology and creativity in both emerging and frontier markets.

Entrepreneurship Boost in Countries Experiencing Violent Conflict?

Entrepreneurship role is boosted by Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation in many areas.  But what about the role of entrepreneurship in countries embroiled in violent political conflict, like Syria?  With the rising displacement of Syrians internally and in neighboring countries, the Syria’s political conflict has also displaced spaces for small business growth and entrepreneurship training.  The Polsky Center dips into the social and logistical challenges by reaching out Syria’s parallel universe of refugees.  Read the following and let us know if you think entrepreneurship training can loop back into countries experiencing violent conflict!

Source: Chicago Tribune: Can entrepreneurship help revive Syria? This Polsky Center leader is training teens in business

 

Chicagoan Steve Lehmann has taken his expertise in early business development nearly 6,000 miles away to the Turkish border town of Reyhanli.

His mission: to teach Syrian teens how to launch startups of their own.

Even as war rages in the nation, there are still students learning business and plenty of people who can’t find work. With unemployment soaring, interest in starting small businesses has grown.

“There are entrepreneurs (in Syria), just like everywhere else,” Ahmad Sufian Bayram, a regional manager at Techstars, told the Guardian. “For the majority of women, they’re starting small businesses to support their families, making handmade items, for example, jewelry, homemade clothes. (Others) are doing freelance work, such as translation services. When we asked them why would you like to be an entrepreneur, it was one of the only options left to make money.”

Since 2011, Syrian refugees in Turkey have invested about $334 million to start more than 6,000 registered companies, many of which are small- and mid-sized businesses, according to a report from the global nonprofit Building Markets.

Lehmann, who’s also assistant director of the Polsky Center’s $20 million Innovation Fund, wants to strengthen the startup trend and “instill a sense of hope” in entrepreneurial-minded teens, he said.

“I’ll be within a short bike ride of the Syrian border and one of the hottest zones in the conflict,” Lehmann said before departing from O’Hare International Airport on Friday. “You never know how these things are going to go, but I’m probably more nervous about being in front of a bunch of kids I don’t know.”

The two-week trip was planned in collaboration with local youth center Karam House, where Lehmann is staying and holding a “hands-on entrepreneurship boot camp” for 15 selected Syrian teens. The work isn’t directly affiliated with the Polsky Center.

The training sessions Lehmann is participating in focus on customer engagement, product prototyping and developing successful business models. Material also pulls from the latest research on how good startups get founded, he said, and includes insights from the National Science Foundation’s Innovation Corps and IDEO.org’s human-center design approach to problem solving.

“Students had to apply and come with a business idea already put together,” Lehmann said. “Within the first four hours of the training, they’re going to be walking the streets of Reyhanli talking to potential customers.” click hereto continue.

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Filed under Analysis, Interests, Technology

Cheaper to Fund Cyber Attacks than to Build Military Bases #QatarCrisis

Dear Pitaconsumers:

PITAPOLICY blogged about the U.S. President of the United States first overseas trip, which included commentary on ’45’s visit to Saudi Arabia and the unusual Qatar crisis that followed–coincidentally–where Qatar’s ambassadors were given 48 hours to leave the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on June 4th.  (Yes: Right in the middle of Ramadan where all of these nations are observing this month long holiday of fasting and patience.)  We were really excited to repost an well-written op-ed by Arab American law professor, Sahar Aziz, who served in the U.S Department of Justice during the Obama administration.  Then, suddenly, the post vanished due to a technology glitch from our site’s end.  (At the worst moment, perhaps some bad words blaming a jinn were uttered.)  Apologies. Now after a week of recollecting what we wrote (and tracking down the sources again), a new development in the Qatar crisis shows that hacking and cyberterrorism played a more significant, pre-meditated role with financial implications for the wealthiest economies in the Middle East & North African region.  We are looking at this second attempt to blog on the Qatar shutout as redemption for the initial frustration with Saudi Arabia’s decision to award ’45’ –not an American museum–with a token gift of the sword.

Trump’s Counter-Terrorism Speech: Sad.

First things first, let’s revisit what we initially reposted by Sahar Aziz in her op-ed to CNN regarding ’45’s’ visit of holy sites that, thankfully, did not go up in flames.

Tr ump’s Doublespeak in Saudi Arabia

by Sahar Aziz

Editor’s Note: Sahar Aziz is an associate professor at Texas A&M University School of Law and nonresident fellow at Brookings Doha Center. She is the author of Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS. The views expressed are her own.

(CNN) If there’s one thing we’ve learned about Donald Trump, it is that he has no qualms about contradicting himself to get what he wants. In Saudi Arabia, he wanted a $110 billion arms deal — not to promote peace and tolerance, as he later proclaimed in his Sunday speech.

Thus, his speech will not “be remembered as the beginning of peace in the Middle East,” as he loftily put it, but rather a boost to the war that is ravaging it. Nor will Trump’s speech put an end to the Islamophobia and bigotry that he has spent the past two years inciting. After all, he needs scapegoats to blame when the terrorism in the Middle East inevitably reaches the United States.

Sahar Aziz

Given Trump’s opportunistic leadership style — what he calls “principled realism”– we can expect more contradictions between his rhetoric and his actions. Four specific contradictions warrant exploring to predict what is in store for American foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as for the treatment of Muslims in the United States.
First, Trump preaches peace and prosperity in his speech, but then sells weapons to the Saudis, which will inevitably fuel war. Trump treats terrorism in the Middle East as a business opportunity to create jobs at home and enrich defense industry tycoons.
While addressing the world’s longest-ruling dictators about terrorism, Trump failed to mention how state violence and repression feeds ISIS and al Qaeda’s propaganda campaigns. Instead, he proclaims the Arab leaders to be defenders of the people’s freedom. As he advised his allies to allow “young Muslim boys and girls (to) be able to grow up free from fear, safe from violence and innocent of hatred,” he disingenuously pretended that the Arab Spring never occurred. The people revolted against their authoritarian governments seeking just those things, but found themselves abandoned by the United States and violently repressed by Arab regimes — which he is once again arming.
Thus, we should not expect any meaningful attempts by the Trump administration to decrease terrorism in the region. Rather, the focus of US counterterrorism strategy will be to geographically contain the violence within the Middle East and prevent it from crossing the Atlantic.
This brings us to the second of Trump’s contradictions — deliberately disconnecting Islam from terrorism in his speech to his Saudi arms purchasers while bolstering Islamophobia in the United States. Over the past two years, Trump has repeatedly stated that “Islam hates us” and Islam is a “hateful foreign ideology,” a kind of rhetoric that has emboldened his white nationalist supporters to discriminate against and attack Muslims. The growing anti-Muslim bigotry could give his administration free rein to disproportionately target Muslims in counterterrorism investigations, surveillance and prosecutions.
Third, there is little evidence Trump is willing to participate in the global effort to “counter extremist ideology,” a new term he strategically coined instead of “radical Islamic terrorism” that he’s been peddling to his right-wing base. As Trump announced a “groundbreaking new center (that) represent(ed) a clear declaration that Muslim-majority countries must take the lead in combatting radicalization,” he took no responsibility for his own divisive rhetoric that radicalizes the political right in the United States. Indeed, over the past five years, extremist ideology from the right has risen at troubling levels.
Accordingly, we should expect the continued use of “radical Islamic terrorism” in his speeches to American audiences and willful blindness to the rise in violence of the alt-right, right-wing militia groups, and the Ku Klux Klan.
Finally, Trump stated that in “the scenes of destruction, in the wake of terror, we see no signs that those murdered were Jewish or Christian, Shia or Sunni.” Here he intimates sympathy for Muslims, even as his domestic policies single out and discriminate against Muslims. His first executive order barred millions of people from Muslim-majority countries from lawfully entering the United States. The refugee clause in the order applied only to Muslim Syrian refugees while exempting Christian Syrian refugees — as if the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Muslim Syrians killed were of no value. And in all of his speeches warning about terrorism committed by Muslims, he has never acknowledged the rise in hate crimes, mosque vandalizations and bullying suffered by Muslims in the United States. For Trump, there is a major difference between Muslims and everyone else.
While citizens in the Middle East and America may find his contradictions repugnant, his audience in Saudi Arabia will not. On the contrary, Middle East authoritarians see Trump as a fellow demagogue who will do whatever it takes to get what he wants. And what he wants has little to do with peace, stability and prosperity for the people of the Middle East.

As Aziz reviews ’45’s’ Saudi trip through the counter-terrorism lens, we agree with her political conclusions regarding his interests overlapping with other authoritarian leaders’ interests, and not with either the American people or people of the Middle East.  Aziz’s parallel commentary on the hypocrisy of focusing on terrorism, born out of extremist ideologies in other countries, and not the extremist ideologies that have transformed into violent actions (a.k.a. terrorism) carried out by certain white-supremacist movements in the U.S., hit home for PITAPOLICY.

Arms Sales #Fail

However, the issue of ’45’ negotiating a final 110 billion U.S.-dollar deal in arms sales to the Gulf countries is “sad” (to quote ’45’ in his own self-aggrandizing terms): an arms sales #FAIL. Yes, a fail,  just like he conflated his “counter-terrorism” speech in Saudi Arabia with believing he addressed the Middle East crisis.  Again, he conflated his negotiation skills and confused it with deals that took years to finalize.   There was no 110 Billion dollar deal, as Brookings Institute Fellow, Bruce Riedel, revealed:
I’ve spoken to contacts in the defense business and on the Hill, and all of them say the same thing: There is no $110 billion deal. Instead, there are a bunch of letters of interest or intent, but not contracts. Many are offers that the defense industry thinks the Saudis will be interested in someday. So far nothing has been notified to the Senate for review. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the arms sales wing of the Pentagon, calls them “intended sales.” None of the deals identified so far are new, all began in the Obama administration.~Bruce Riedel in Markaz
Basically, one cannot even believe how ’45’ claims financial success for America or his ability to really broker diplomacy within a region that has become home to over 10 American military bases. At the same time, he pontificates about terrorism, but does not even see the irony of promoting weapons sales to countries, like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait.
 Yet, it is worth noting that the Bahrain is home to the U.S. Navy’s fifth fleet.  Saudi Arabia and Qatar also host a few U.S. military bases.  Specifically, Qatar hosts the American al-Udeid airbase.  The UAE is begging for one too, apparently.  See Figure 1, which shows how the U.S. leads among U.N. permanent members in military bases throughout the Middle East.  Note how Russia has none.  Then view Figure 2 to see where Russia deploys military bases.  We will revisit this military base disparity in a moment.

Figure 1: U.N. Permanent Members’ Military Bases in the Middle East

Source: Rob Prince Blog https://robertjprince.net/2017/01/30/notes-from-trumps-middle-east-policy-lost-in-the-desert-kgnu-hemispheres-middle-east-dialogues-with-ibrahim-kazerooni-and-rob-prince-january-24-2017/

Figure 2: Russian Military Bases as of 2015

Source: Al Jazeera
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/18/russia-foreign-military-bases.html

Cyber Hack Attack: Qatar Kerfuffle

Initially, leaked emails allegedly revealed that Qatar funded terrorist groups.  Here is where the four Arab nations’ kerfuffle with Qatar turns stranger: the origin of the leaked emails may lead back to the UAE ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Otaiba, for the following motivations:

  1. Political-Military: Nations, like Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, have been critical of the U.S. nuclear deal with Iran and have opposed any improving relations between Iran and the U.S. and resent Qatar’s diplomatic ties with Iran.
  2. Economic-Military: Related to point one, but recognizing that the UAE specifically seeks to gain for Qatar’s isolation.  The UAE seeks increasing U.S. ties and wants a U.S. base on its soil, which would invite large construction and security project dollars.
  3. Political: Qatar also hosts the largest Arabic media outlet, Al-Jazeera, which has criticized Middle East regimes for the last two decades.

Since our last attempt to discuss the fallout from ’45’s’ visit, Qatar’s 2.7 million people may face a food shortage since 38 percent of its food comes from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  An opportunity for neighboring Iran emerges if Qatar decides to buy their food from them. Nonetheless, Qatar leads the world in Liquified Natural Gas production.  Qatar’s other two leading sectors: manufacturing and transport –which have respectively dropped 18% and 31% since 2017 began–may face further decline resulting from the Arab blockade.

Unfortunately, the main issue– who is financing terrorist groups– is swinging in a limbo of authenticating emails and identifying the truth.  Investigations show that Russia may be the source of a disinformation campaign through cyber terrorism.  But they were not alone; the disinformation campaign served the interests of other nations too, like the UAE and Israel.

Remember our earlier point about the stark contrast between the number of U.S. and Russian bases in the Middle East?

The Qatar kerfuffle illustrates two takeaways for PITAPOLICY:

  1. friend, or foe, a variety of nations have crossed the fine line of self-righteousness and hypocrisy in the case of financing armed groups in Syria.
  2. It is cheaper to to fund a cyber attack and facilitate a diplomatic meltdown and ensuing trade blockade than it is to fund building a military base to launch attacks.

Unfortunately, Russia has figured that out before us.

By the way: we are still troubled by Saudi Arabia giving a sword to ’45’ as much as we are troubled by his bragging about a so-called arms deal that his administration actually did not orchestrate within a four-month period.

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That which is measured improves. #Hope #SyrianRefugees

Pearson’s Law: “That which is measured improves. That which is measured and reported improves exponentially.” – Karl Pearson

Greetings Pita-Consumers!

Before you do anything: share this link with your organizations and friends working to assist Syrian refugees.  Note: there are 4.89 Million Syrian refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ office. It’s been a rough week for many (ourselves included)–considering that Egypt’s former dictator, Hosni Mubarak, was found acquitted of the 900 protestors’ deaths during the 2011 Egyptian January 25th revolution by Egypt’s highest court: the Court of Cassation.  The fallen dictator has gone free as 60,000 political activists remain in Egypt’s jails.

Read here for Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egyptian scholar’s (and pacifist) account of political prisoner dilemma and costs in Egypt.

Right as we think we are witnessing the fall of an authoritarian leader, we are seeing the rise of another authoritarian leader (45: #OrangeAlert) in the very country that has selectively shamed authoritarian led regimes in the Middle East and North African regions…and consistently provided international assistance to Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others.

Measure to Improve: Survey of Syrian Refugees’ Experience

On a more positive note, we want to be pro-active on a dismal subject: Syrian refugee resettlement and relief efforts. If we can measure something, we increase its chances of improving.  Thus, we would like to continue using this platform to gather data to measure and promote the greater good.  (Al Mubadarah refers to this as “MENA Social Good”, which we’ll borrow again.)  To understand how Syrian refugees resettlement experience, we need to ask them.  A survey an Arabic is one data gathering tool.  Because the target population is spread throughout three continents, the data responses will vary.  So let us step away from generalizations and specifically ask Syrian refugees who are participating in resettlement programs.  Please share the link: https://universityofsussex.eu.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_3I8ZpUMnZJejQSV&Q_JFE=0

Survey Background

Two months ago, we sat next to a social scientist at a Syria Forum USA event in Chicago.  As we discussed the power shortages and livelihood assistance in Lebanon, we discussed the burgeoning Syrian refugee population in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq.

Registered Refugees According to United Nations Data (more Syrians could be seeking refugee in host country)

Although Gulf Cooperation Countries do not share in the refugee accommodation, the Syrian diaspora has grown in Germany, Sweden, the UK, and France (over 850,000 asylum applications received including those pending)… and across the Atlantic Ocean in Canada.  Yes, and a humble amount (10,000) in the USA.   The current U.S. president inaccurately portrayed the demographic makeup of the Syrian refugee population.  According to Politifact, about three-quarters of Syrian refugees entering the United States are women and children under 18 years of age.  Here’s a breakdown of fiscal year 2016 Syrian refugee admissions:

– Total: 12,587

– Male: 6,571

– Female: 6,016

– Boys and girls under 14 years old: 6,118 (about 48.61 percent of admissions)

The gentleman is collaborating with an Arabic speaking member from the University of Sussex to gather data from Syrian refugees who may be participating in resettlement programs.  As the social scientist stated to us, “The survey responses are confidential and they will only be used for statistical purposes only and no identifying information will be shared outside of the research group,” we would like to help facilitate their outreach efforts.

Here’s a shout out to White Helmets (@SyriaCivilDef) because of their Message to the United Nations Security Council:

“Barrel bombs – sometimes filled with chlorine – are the biggest killer of civilians in Syria today. Our unarmed and neutral rescue workers have saved more than 78,529 people from the attacks in Syria, but there are many we cannot reach. There are children trapped in rubble we cannot hear. For them, the UN Security Council must follow through on its demand to stop the barrel bombs, by introducing a ‘no-fly zone’ if necessary.” – Raed Saleh, head of the White Helmets, the Syrian Civil Defence.

Hopefully the following U.S.-based NGOs supporting Syrian refugees and human development will be able to circulate the above survey.

  • Syrian American Medical Society (@SAMS_US):  Founded in 1998 in Chicago, the national network mobilized in 2012 to upgrade its medical care services to Syrians after the Syrian uprising against the Assad regime transformed into crisis mode in 2013.  SAMS launched the “Save Syrian Lives” campaign to focus on medical relief activities directed to help Syrian patients, healthcare workers, administrators and hospitals to deal with the multi-faceted consequences of violent conflict impacting all affected areas of Syria.
  • Syrian American Council (@SA_Council)
  • Syria Forum USA (@SyrianForumUSA): Description previously highlighted by PITAPOLICY
  • Syrian Community Network (@SCN_Network):The Syrian Community Network (SCN) was established by a diverse team of community members with intentions to aid and to assist in easing the resettlement of Syrian refugees. SCN is prepared and organized to support the anticipated influx of Syrian refugees scheduled for resettlement in the Chicagoland area.  SCN is a 501(c)3 non-profit organization that will supplement efforts on helping the refugees adjust to their new home. What distinguishes SCN from other organizations is that it wants to facilitate building the bridge for mutual support between the newly arrived Syrian refugees with local Chicago communities.The following are SCN goals:To partner with refugee resettlement agencies in providing support to the newly-arrived Syrian refugees
    To connect refugees with appropriate services and community resources available
    To foster a relationship between the Syrian refugees and the larger Chicago community
    To establish cultural competency for staff working with Syrian refugees as well as for Syrians who need to learn about their new culture in the US.

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Iran, Saudi Arabia, and US: The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Frenemy

“The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

We would like to challenge the above ancient proverb that advises one to befriend his enemy’s friend because they share a common goal: defeat the shared enemy.  We challenge it because the proverb did not foresee several”Machiavellis” emerging to power at the same time.  Therefore, PITAPOLICY moves to amend this advice: The enemy of my enemy is my frenemy.  (Thanks to Stephen Colbert for his word wit and Washington’s Blog for laying out a 21st century example in the MENA region for showing the errors in applying to multi-actor settings.)

Relationship Chart Analysis by Joshua Keating, Slate Magazine and Chris Kirk.

Former Iranian President Khatami noted the hawkish upswing in the United States because of the 45th U.S. President.  Khatami, who comes from The Reform party, faces a government ban from official media.  Nonetheless, this has not stopped him from warning his fellow Iranians that “this is the best time for an environment of national reconciliation”–which hints to the current Iranian leadership to recognize the dissident movements, like political prisoners who participated in the 2009 Green Movement, according to political commentator, Arash Karami.  Perhaps the controversial “45” will inadvertantly unite some hawkish and moderate voices in Iran.  Reconciliation is not unwarranted given that Iran’s Foreign Minister wants to upgrade Saudi Arabia to its ‘Frenemy’ list, according to this speech at the World Economic Forum:

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was crystal clear at the World Economic Congress in Davos on Jan. 18 when he said that Iran and Saudi Arabia must cooperate to end the conflicts in Syria and Yemen, just like they did in Lebanon when they worked to lift the obstacles for Lebanese presidential elections.

Original Source: Addiyar (Arabic newspaper:)
Some may argue that a recent example of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia brokered a deal among Lebanese political parties to produce a president, while Lebanese party heads deny this.
On a somewhat related note: neither the Syrian nor Yemen conflicts emerged in the top ten twitter chatter topics during the World Economic Forum, according to the Netnograph site.  Netnograph tracks the leading topics of interest at global events.

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