Morocco’s Constitutional Reforms: Al Jazeera Reports

King Mohammed VI Presents Constitutional Reforms But Will Appoint President

Protests called against Morocco reform plan
Pro-democracy activists call for fresh demonstrations, saying the king’s proposals are not enough.
Last Modified: 18 Jun 2011 11:00

Morocco’s youth-based February 20 Movement has called for nationwide protests against constitutional
changes proposed by King Mohammed VI.

The king outlined curbs to his wide political powers in an address to the nation on Friday and pledged to build a constitutional monarchy with a democratic parliament.

“The national co-ordinators [of the 20 Movement] have called for a demonstration Sunday for a truly democratic constitution and a parliamentary monarchy,” a member of the movement’s Rabat section told the AFP news agency on Saturday.

“The plan as proposed by the king yesterday does not respond to our demands for a true separation of powers. We will protest peacefully on Sunday against this plan.”

The proposals, to be put to a referendum on July 1, devolve many of the king’s powers to the prime minister and parliament.

Mohammed, 47, who in 1999 took over the Arab world’s longest-serving dynasty, currently holds virtually all power in the Muslim north African country, and he is also its top religious authority as the Commander of the Faithful.

Powers trimmed

The proposed amendments would provide for the strengthening of the authority of the country’s prime minister and parliament.

The prime minister would become the “president of the government”, and would be able to appoint government officials – an authority previously held only by the king.

Ahmed Benchemsi, a Moroccan journalist, discusses the constitutional changes proposed by King Mohammed VI

The new “president of the government” would also be able to dissolve parliament, the king announced, another role previously accorded only to Mohammed VI.

The new constitution ensures the prime minister is selected from the party that received the most votes in election, rather than just chosen by the king.

“We encourage a parliamentary authority that is ready to make sure that parliament makes final legislative decisions,” the king said. “This parliament has the ability to question any official in the country.”

However, the king would remain a key power-broker in the security, military and religious fields.

The king will continue to chair two key councils – the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Security Council – which make security policy.

The prime minister can chair these councils, but only using an agenda set by the king.

The reform proposals come in the wake of nationwide pro-reform demonstrations that started on February 20 – hence the name of the movement – inspired by other popular uprisings sweeping the Arab world.

Source: Al Jazeera and agencies

Foreign Policy Magazine analysis
“Game of Thrones”-By James Traub
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/10/game_of_thrones

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Options for Syria: What Do You Think?

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Reuters’ Analysis: Syria’s Assad loses his grip to hardliners


Analysis: Syria’s Assad loses his grip to hardliners

Credit: Reuters/Umit Bektas
By Samia Nakhoul

Protesters hold defaced posters of Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad during a demonstration to express solidarity with Syria’s anti-government protesters in front of the Syrian embassy in Ankara June 10, 2011.
Credit: Reuters/Umit Bektas
By Samia Nakhoul

LONDON | Thu Jun 16, 2011 8:55am EDT

LONDON (Reuters) – President Bashar al-Assad is losing control to his hardline relatives, his forces are overstretched, his government is running out of money and the revolt against his rule is gathering support and funding.

Given all this, analysts and Syrian-based diplomats say the international community is starting to plan for a Syria without the Assads.

The risks of a slide into sectarian war are significant, most Syria-watchers nonetheless say, believing Assad will fight to the end, and start to regionalize the conflict by inciting violence in Lebanon, Turkey and across the borders with Israel.

“Despite everything they have done over the past few weeks — killing, torture, mass arrests and raids — the protests are continuing,” said one Western diplomat. “This regime will fight to the death, but the only strategy they have is to kill people, and this is accelerating the crisis.”

In its attempt to stamp out protests across the country of 23 million, the government has withdrawn most security forces from the suburbs of the capital, Damascus, diplomats say.

Yet each time the authorities go in hard to deal with one center of rebellion, other towns rise up.

Reliant on two elite units commanded by his brother Maher — the 4th Armored Division and the Republican Guard — as well as secret police and militia from his minority Alawite sect, President Assad is plainly overstretched.

“Our assessment is that the regime will fall,” predicted the Damascus-based diplomat. “They have three to six months of actual military capabilities to sustain this, but they cannot keep a prolonged operation going indefinitely.”

Najib al-Ghadban, a Syrian academic and activist, said in London there was a broad consensus on overthrowing the Assad family after 40 years in power.

“We believe strongly that the regime has lost its legitimacy. It has no vision on how to get the country out of the crisis. The situation is deteriorating,” Ghadban said. “We are certain this will reach a positive end like Tunisia and Egypt,” he added.

So far more than 1,100 people have been killed, up to 10,000 detained and thousands have fled since the crackdown began, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The international community, diplomats said, see a post-Assad era ideally facilitated by a military coup and several governments are encouraging Syrian generals to mutiny.

“We are isolating him and his family. We’re addressing military leaders and cabinet members to rise up. We’re encouraging the generals to rise up,” the diplomat said.

“The key variable is the continuation of the momentum (of the revolt). We really believe there is no point of return.”

FATALLY WEAKEN

He and other analysts also believe that Syria’s economic paralysis, amid insistent reports the government is running out of money and having to call on its inner circle for emergency funding, will fatally weaken the Assads.

One diplomat said Assad’s cousin, the business tycoon Rami Makhlouf who is a hate figure for protesters, has recently deposited $1 billion at the central bank to stabilize the Syrian pound.

“When they are no longer capable of paying the salaries of bureaucrats, the army, the police and their Alawite militia this crisis will balloon and bring about the collapse of the regime,” the diplomat said. “This is a train wreck waiting to happen.”

Signs of stretched resources and fraying loyalties are already apparent.

As protests started to spread, the authorities pulled out contingents of security and elite forces from the capital, which are now firefighting from Deraa in the south to Jisr al-Sughour in the north, the scene of heavy reprisals after the government this month claimed to have lost 120 dead to “armed gangs.”

But even so residents say there are demonstrations every weekend in Damascus and surrounding suburbs.

The bloodshed in Jisr al Shugour was the result of splits in army ranks, diplomats say, an ominous sign for the Assads.

“Around 50 soldiers and mid ranking officers defected and were supported by locals and the authorities sent a force to counter them and 120 were killed,” said another Syria-based diplomat, dismissing government accounts this was the work of Salafi fundamentalists as propaganda.

He and others point to the growing sophistication of the rebellion, which draws support from across society.

“After three months this is not a poor man’s uprising. There is significant financing from the Syrian business community and upper class. They give money for satellite phones, cameras, food, water and medical supplies,” the resident diplomat said.

“This is a broad-based movement that includes not only Syrian youth, but imams from mosques, businessmen, even former Baath party members.”

Analysts are puzzled by Assad’s failure to address the nation in a speech since the revolt started in mid-March. They point out that conciliatory statements by Assad promising that protesters will not be fired on and the killings that followed show that he is not in control.

“The big unanswered question concerns the president,” said Patrick Seale, biographer of Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad.

“The question is: Is he (Bashar) complicit with the killing or has he been pushed aside? The people running the show are the hardliners, the thugs.”

Seale added: “Assad is not in charge. He is showing no leadership. He is depasse. They have really taken over.”

STATE OF FEAR

Residents of Syria describe a state of fear and panic among the Alawite community, saying there had been revenge attacks against Alawite army officers and security men. They said Alawite officers in Sunni areas have pulled their children out of school and sent their families to Alawite villages or abroad.

Syrian activist Ausama Monajed said the international community, which has put 13 Syrian officials on its sanctions list, should add army officers involved in killing protesters as well as Syrian firms linked to the Assad family.

Syrian oil sales, worth $7-8 million a day and which Monajed says go directly to fund the military, should be boycotted. Arab states must build a consensus against Assad by lobbying China and Russia for a Security Council resolution, he said.

All scenarios that anticipate the downfall of Assad, however, depend on the Sunni-dominated army splitting, while Western military intervention such as in Libya is unlikely in Syria because of the regional risks.

Analysts say the risks are high that Syria, an ally of Iran and Lebanon’s Shi’ite Hezbollah guerrillas and with a sectarian and ethnic mix of Sunni, Kurdish, Alawite and Christians, could slip into war.

Syria, they add, can make trouble in the region by trying to incite another war between Hezbollah and Israel. Recent demonstrations on the Israeli-Syrian frontier, which had been quiet for 38 years, were encouraged by Syrian authorities in an attempt to broaden the conflict.

“The Syrians have their fingers in many pies. They have many levers to put pressure on their neighbors and create problems between Hezbollah and Israel, between Sunni and Shi’ites in Lebanon and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and AKP (Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s party) in Turkey,” the diplomat said.

(Editing by Giles Elgood)

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Testimony of Assault at DC Protest

[slideshow]On Saturday afternoon, June 11th, 2011, Khaled Abdallah walked to a Free Syria rally held in front of the White House in Washington, DC. Below is the testimony of Khaled, the young man, who was assaulted by a mob of Pro-Assad/regime supporters residing in the United States and holding a Pro-Assad rally at the same time and location as the Free Syria rally. Later that day, around 4:30pm EST, PITA POLICY tweeted an image of his injuries.

For the record, Pro-Freedom/Democracy supporters have been peacefully protesting in front of the White House for the last two months without any incident. Members of the Syrian Emergency Task Force have helped organize in addition to other groups. However, the incident marked the first time the police got involved, and unfortunately, arrested the wrong individual. Furthermore, what happened on Saturday was the first time Pro-Assad supporters convened to launch a counter-protest. ~PITA POLICY

Victim’s Testimony: Assault by Pro-Assad Supporters in Washington, DC“‘One hour good?’ I asked my family just before printing our parking receipt. Everyone nodded in agreement: it was a hot sunny day and none of us knew much about Syria. An hour would be plenty to check out the Syrian awareness rally, and grab some ice cream in the city. On the way over to the event, my niece, sister, brother, and I talked about our favorite ice cream flavors. Little did I know though that our day would not end with ice cream.

Less than a minute after stepping foot on the lawn across from the White House, a man in his 20’s grabbed the collar of my shirt, and yelled at the top of his lungs in Arabic “Oh people, this is him, this is him! Come and kill him! This is him – Kill him!” Completely confused, I thought the guy was joking. In my natural good-humored response, I started laughing; but quickly, I realized it was no joke. The crowd swelled around me, pounding on me from every direction and chanting, “Kill him! Kill him! Kill him!” Helpless, I yelled out in English “No, no, you have the wrong guy!” I tried reasoning with them, “Who are you looking for?” They ignored my pleas, and increased their aggression, chanting and cursing at me in both English and Arabic.

Before I knew it, a guy much bigger than me jumped on me from behind and put me in a headlock, forcing me to the ground. Meanwhile, the circle around me grew to over 20 men, hitting, kicking, and punching me from all directions. The men, women, and children cheered and chanted in unison “Kill him! Kill him!” Fearing for their lives, my niece and sister ran away from the crowd and went to look for help as they screamed frantically. My brother tried to distract the mob to no avail.

Still nailed to the ground, with blood gushing out of my forehead, legs, and ribs, all stinging against the burning sun, I felt the ebb of pain. My eyes saw the world blurred together, and my ears heard the curses muffled into an inaudible cacophony. I was on the verge of losing my consciousness. The next thing I remember is being dragged away to safety by a team of men in blue: U.S. Park Police and Secret Service Police.
Although the U.S. police officers had just saved my life, amidst the craziness of the angry mob, they were unsure of who was the victim and who was the aggressor. They proceeded to handcuff and detain me for almost 3 hours while “they sorted things out.” They were unable to identify the men who tried to kill me because the mob was so big. Finally, as the rally died down, my family identified one of the main ringleaders that placed me in a chokehold. The cops briefly detained and questioned him, and gave me two options:
1.) Spend the weekend in jail along with the perpetrator until a judge could
hear the case on Monday. All witnesses would have to be present on Monday, including my young niece, or they could be subpoenaed.
2.) Each of us write a witness statement, and then I decline to
file charges.
Because I did not want my family to see me spend the weekend in jail for ironically being the victim of a horrendous crime, I chose the latter option. I wanted to in fact press charges to the fullest extent under the law and prosecute these Pro-Assad terrorists who beat and victimized me in front of my family.

Prior to today’s atrocious experience, I had not been following the situation in Syria, and considered myself merely a bystander. But after being beat up by Pro-Assad thugs for no reason, I express my deepest sympathies for the people of Syria. Considering the injuries I sustained on U.S. soil, right across from the White House, I cannot even imagine what types of atrocities are occurring in Syria!

I did some research and found that the ringleaders who put me in a chokehold is a 25 year old from Allentown, PA. His name is “Elias Batihk.” He wants to be a police officer. His twitter site is: http://twitter.com/#!/KingEliii10
Just moments after beating me, on the afternoon of June 11th, he tweeted “Anti Assad protester attacks Pro Assad demonstrators outside the White house in DC . You tell me who wants democracy”

I am committed to sharing the truth with all of you. Born and raised in America, democracy is in my blood. Nevertheless, I did not come to the rally to fight for democracy; I came to observe, and share a good time in the city with my family. For no reason, I ended up on the ground, humiliated and beat by Pro-Assad thugs. If it were not for the U.S. Secret Service, I may have taken my last breath through that suffocating headlock. Although my Saturday did not end in ice cream, I am refreshed with life, and a new mission to stop the Pro-Assad thugs from further terrorism at home and abroad.”

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“How Tyrants Endure” ~New York Times Op-Ed

OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS
How Tyrants Endure
By BRUCE BUENO De MESQUITA and ALASTAIR SMITH
Published: June 9, 2011

WHY do certain dictators survive while others fall? Throughout history, downtrodden citizens have tried to throw off the yoke of their oppressors, but revolutions, like those sweeping through the Arab world, are rare.
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Otto Dettmer
Related in News

Egypt’s Economy Slows to a Crawl; Revolt Is Tested (June 10, 2011)
Times Topic: Middle East Protests (2010-11)
Despotic rulers stay in power by rewarding a small group of loyal supporters, often composed of key military officers, senior civil servants and family members or clansmen. A central responsibility of these loyalists is to suppress opposition to the regime. But they only carry out this messy, unpleasant task if they are well rewarded. Autocrats therefore need to ensure a continuing flow of benefits to their cronies.

If the dictator’s backers refuse to suppress mass uprisings or if they defect to a rival, then he is in real trouble. That is why successful autocrats reward their cronies first, and the people last. As long as their cronies are assured of reliable access to lavish benefits, protest will be severely suppressed. Once the masses suspect that crony loyalty is faltering, there is an opportunity for successful revolt. Three types of rulers are especially susceptible to desertion by their backers: new, decrepit and bankrupt leaders.

Newly ensconced dictators do not know where the money is or whose loyalty they can buy cheaply and effectively. Thus, during transitions, revolutionary entrepreneurs can seize the moment to topple a shaky new regime.

Even greater danger lurks for the aging autocrat whose cronies can no longer count on him to deliver the privileges and payments that ensure their support. They know he can’t pay them from beyond the grave. Decrepitude slackens loyalty, raising the prospects that security forces will sit on their hands rather than stop an uprising, giving the masses a genuine chance to revolt. This is what brought about the end of dictatorships in the Philippines, Zaire and Iran.

In addition to rumors of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s and Hosni Mubarak’s health concerns, Tunisia and Egypt suffered serious economic problems that kindled rebellion. Grain and fuel prices were on the rise, unemployment, particularly among the educated, was high and, in Egypt’s case, there had been a substantial decline in American aid (later reinstated by President Obama). Mr. Mubarak’s military backers, beneficiaries of that aid, worried that he was no longer a reliable source of revenue.

As money becomes scarce, leaders can’t pay their cronies, leaving no one to stop the people if they rebel. This is precisely what happened during the Russian and French revolutions and the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe — and why we predicted Mr. Mubarak’s fall in a presentation to investors last May.

Today’s threat to Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria can be seen in much the same light. With a projected 2011 deficit of approximately 7 percent of G.D.P., declining oil revenue and high unemployment among the young, Mr. Assad faces the perfect conditions for revolution. He may be cracking heads today, but we are confident that either he will eventually enact modest reforms or someone will step into his shoes and do so.

Contagion also plays an important part in revolutionary times. As people learn that leaders in nearby states can’t buy loyalty, they sense that they, too, may have an opportunity. But it does not automatically lead to copycat revolutions. In many nations, particularly the oil-rich Gulf States, either there has been no protest or protest has been met with violence. In Bahrain, for example, 60 percent of government revenue comes from the oil and gas sector; its leaders have therefore faced few risks in responding to protests with violent oppression.

This is because resource-rich autocrats have a reliable revenue stream available for rewarding cronies — and repression does not jeopardize this flow of cash. Natural resource wealth explains why the octogenarian Robert Mugabe shows no sign of stepping down in Zimbabwe and the oil-rich Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi has given little hint of compromise from the start in Libya. As NATO bombs fall on Tripoli, however, Colonel Qaddafi is discovering that he needs to convince remaining loyalists that he can re-establish control over Libya’s oil riches or they, too, will turn on him. Sadly, if the rebels win, they are also likely to suppress freedom to ensure their control over oil wealth.

Regimes rich in natural resources or flush with foreign aid can readily suppress freedom of speech, a free press and, most important, the right to assemble. By contrast, resource-poor leaders can’t easily restrict popular mobilization without simultaneously making productive work so difficult that they cut off the tax revenues they need to buy loyalty.

Such leaders find themselves between a rock and a hard place and would be wise to liberalize preemptively. This is why we expect countries like Morocco and Syria to reform over the next few years even if their initial response to protest is repression. The same incentive for democratization exists in many countries that lack a natural reservoir of riches like China and Jordan — a bad omen for authoritarian rulers and good news for the world’s oppressed masses.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith are professors of politics at New York University and the authors of “The Dictator’s Handbook.”
A version of this op-ed appeared in print on June 10, 2011, on page A35 of the New York edition with the headline: How Tyrants Endure.

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PITA POLICY Welcomes TIME Magazine’s 2011 Influencers

“Words and numbers are equally important…it’s the thought behind them that speak and count more.”~PITA POLICY

 

Intelligence, humor, leadership, and innovation catapult our notable American Influencers into Time magazine’s 100 Influencers.  As an American-Muslim, who specializes in political economy of the Middle East & North African region (MENA), I’m inspired by Time’s 100 Influencers: Joseph Stiglitz, Amy Poehler, Michelle Obama & Ron Bruder in launching PITA POLICY!  (www.PITAPOLICY.com serves as a political economy website focusing on the MENA region.)  As a humanist, I am proud that nine are Muslim heroes to Americans and global citizens; and that many hail from MENA.  These nine indicate that philanthropy, business, economy, the arts, spirituality, journalism, and the law influence for the better of humanity—not just Muslims. 

 

When Joseph Stiglitz spoke at my graduation’s commencement ceremony at Georgetown, his words infused me with confidence that someone who appreciates the power of numbers, may one day supplement the power of words.  Economists need not run to the financial service world; they may enter public service and leverage their cost benefit analysis to address general welfare as the US determines its destiny beyond recession and deficit war spending. 
 
Amy Poehler represents how Americans need the humor to snap back into reality when we have made miscalculations or taken missteps.  God knows that I have gotten my cynicism checked by Poehler’s wit on Saturday Night Live, Parks & Recreations, and the “Mighty Bee.”  (There’s nothing wrong with being perky.)  If you can laugh past it, then you can move forward to address the next set of challenges.  Perhaps that is why my generation runs on a daily dose of fake news provided by Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert: humor serves as our “checks and balances” on punditry, which “checks” our politicians. 
 
Michelle Obama’s efforts to civically engage on American family challenges, like healthy eating and supporting veterans, remind me that American values mean we take responsbility for our choices—whether it be facing the consequences of poor diet or recognizing that our veterans suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress syndrome or deserve fair health treatment and housing—like their American compatriots. 
 
Rod Bruder’s innovation addresses the very challenge that international development communities try to incorporate within their strategic plans.  Specifically, Bruder picks a side in the “demographic gift” versus the “demographic bulge” debate.  While Middle East Analysts and academics continually assess the Arab Spring and the successful political reovolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, they point out that the youth still need to be engaged economically, not just politically.  Thus, his organization, Education for Employment Foundation, targets thousands under the age of 35 in Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, and Morocco.  Moreover, EFE recognizes that the West Bank & Gaza experience 92.5 percent literacy, thereby resulting in an employable population.  As such, EFE partners with a range of universities like Birzeit, Colorado State and Islamic University to train accountants, project managers, among others.   
 
As a humanist, I am proud that 9 are Muslim heroes to Americans and global citizens.  Specifically, I feel inspired by the breadth and diversity of gender, occupation, and philosophical persuasion by this year’s influencers:  1) Maria Bashir~Law Enforcer; 2) Fathi Terbil~HR Lawyer; 3) Saad Mohseni~Media Moghul; 4) Wael Ghonim~Activist; 5) Feisal Abdul Rauf~Preacher; 6) El General~Tunisian Rapper; 7) Ayman Mohyeldin~Journalist; 8) Azim Premji~Philanthropist & 9) Ahmed Shuja Pasha.  Although, Time’s 100 Influencers also include some infamous Muslims, I reflect upon how they symbolize the minority of many Muslim Americans—just as they make up only 4 percent of the list.  (4 of the 5 Rogues’ Gallery list Muslim figures who are deemed as infamous.)  Futhermore, I am relieved that Osama bin Laden has been eliminated from the manufactured “ideological” debate.  Bin Laden no longer may claim to speak for Muslims,  or any global citizen.  But more importantly, what gives me comfort is that more Muslims have risen to the occasion to produce positive impact for all global citizens—not just Muslims.  Intelligence, humor, leadership, and innovation are the values that Time reminds me are respected throughout our economic, political, cultural, spiritual, and social global villages. 

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BBC News – Syria: Army ‘moves on Jisr al-Shughour’

BBC News – Syria: Army ‘moves on Jisr al-Shughour’.

To what extent will Turkey step up its pressure on Bashar al Assad to stop killing his people?

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East Asia as a Testing Ground for General Theory: Can MENA duplicate that success without the Pitfalls?

Atul Kohli explores the state’s capacities and relationships with business and labor to foster a set of conditions, which developing states tend to encompass to promote heavy industrialization.  He asserts that institutions that facilitate or inhibit economic decisions shadow even the state’s political elite assumed power; this emerges as a prominent feature of post-colonial nations.  By dissecting the political economies of Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Korea, Kohli advances his argument:  states who demonstrated industrialization success, implemented effective policy to support investor profits.

As a result, he answers Lloyd Reynolds’ call to insert the “political” variable into the economic models by formulating three LDC prototypes:  neopatrimonial states, cohesive-capitalist states, and fragmented class states (Kohli p. 8).  Neo-patrimonial characterizes Nigeria since its experiences show how the authority and sectional’s personal interests damage the process of pursuing development goals.  Secondly, cohesive-capitalist states include South Korea and Brazil—at times.  Although they possess competent bureaucracies, centralized authority marginalize populist efforts as prescribed under Park Chung Hee’s leadership (Kohli, .21).  Finally he articulates that India, which exhibits multi-class interests but regress into a non-goal oriented mode during class alliance, acts as a fragmented-multiclass state.

Essentially, I believe that Kohli refuses to relegate the state to persona non grata since he challenges laissez-faire desire to remove the state.  Instead, the state must learn to balance its mandate to maintain political stability, but possess the flexibility to encompass social change.  Social change, as Kohli declares, catalyzes as well as results from industrialization (Kohli p. 17).  The mechanism for social dynamics to flourish appears to function also as an implementing body, or institutions.  Hence, I gain clarity on Kohli’s institution building discussion—stronger institutions within civil society and government can better gauge the match between societal needs and implementation efficiency.

Hakimian reminds us that the MENA region’s economic performance started to lag as a result of the post oil-boom’s statist policies.  This is an important point when considering that non-oil producing countries labor brought in remittances.  Despite the benefits of the oil boom to MENA, other regions like East and South Asia experienced a higher growth rate of 8% and 2.5% respectively during the 90s.  Meanwhile, the OPEC nations continue to see falling real per capita incomes, Syria and Tunisia have witnessed some moderate reversal of the their lagging performances.

Hakimian argues that the MENA region must embark on policies to diversity their economic structures in addition to improving its economic growth.  In fact, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the MENA region has also declined while fast growth parallels increased FDI in China and Malaysia. While he blames demography as one of the causes for faltering growth, others, like Tarik Yusuf, stress that inefficient governance and heavy government intervention demonstrate stronger explanatory power than demography to deconstruct faltering economic growth.  However, Hakimian relies on data, which exemplify MENA’s increased population rate of 3% exceeds most other low and middle-income countries.  He also shows how the recent economic reforms in Tunisia complicate the MENA picture since Syria’s statist regime prompted recent high growth records (Hakimian, p. 86).  The oil sector enabled Arab nations to retard efforts to promote outward-oriented policy exhibited by the Far East.  Riordan and Hoekman suggest strategies for MENA to partake in the developing countries ability to capture 25% of the manufactured export market.  For example, Hoekman advances enlisting in the WTO or subscribing to the Mediterranean Imitative.

In analyzing the East Asian debt crisis, many reflect that indicators appeared subtle.  Hence, the structure of debt and its uses warranted more analysis as an explanatory factor since 80% coalesced in the private sector characterized by many short term loans that matured in less than a year (Hakimian p. 94).   As suggested by strict adherents of the Washington Consensus, “crony capitalism” precipitated the Debt Crisis because corporate governance excluded transparency.  Despite such an extreme interpretation, markets proved fallible.   Also another opportunity arises for MENA to hesitate with enacting pure market economy policy especially since Hakimian and Stiglitz emphasize that non-domestic factors contributed towards the economic shortfall.  Thus, while we try to encourage MENA countries to integrate globally, we should reflect on how to manage a future crisis since misallocating resources occurs on an international scale as well.  Furthermore, we could analyze the regional opportunities that can assist in stabilizing monetary shortages.  However, Hakimian posed the example of Japan’s reserves functioning within an “Asian Monetary Fund”;  the safeguard encountered opposition from the U.S (Hakimian p. 96).  I am curious to explore Chang’s challenge to the extreme claims.

It appears that Hakimian favors shared growth, which advocates gradual integration.  Government still possess a vital role since markets do fail, as seen not only with the Asian Debt Crisis, but in America’s own experience with the Depression.  Therefore, MENA countries like other LDCs should not be thrust into the global economy until the institutional capabilities of the MENA governments fully develop and possess the capacity to curtail macro-economic shocks.

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