December 14, 2011

Comparing Iraq & Syria: Economic Sanctions’ Revolutionary Success Depends on Civil Disobedience

Washington, DC ~ On Monday, President Obama received Prime Minister Nour Al Maliki In Washington, DC to announce the end of the war in Iraq, which was previously announced by former President Bush back in 2003. A war ends twice, but troop withdrawal happens once–albeit in phases. At the end of this month, the last of American troops will fold the American flag and return home. Nonetheless, as Obama and Prime Minister Nour Al-Maliki share optimism for the future of a post-war, post-authoritarian-bogeyman (Saddam/Osama), and post-sanctions Iraq, Syria sees that Assad authoritarianism happens twice, but revolution happens once–albeit in phases. Will the repeat incidence of international condemnation and economic sanctions in Syria benefit from any lessons learned by its neighbor Iraq? I argue that economic sanctions’ revolutionary success depends on civil disobedience. When it comes to revolution, change comes from within–before and after the Arab Spring.

Economic Sanctions: Weapon of Mass Distraction
Prior to the invasion of Iraq, I had always hoped for the end of the Iraqi sanctions regime. As an undergrad in the University of Chicago, I had argued in my college thesis that the economic sanctions regime were not only effective, but perhaps too effective. Iraqi civilians felt the brunt of Saddam’s inhumane treatment of political dissidents and minorities. They also felt the brunt of a decimated economy–similar to the entire elementary class facing detention because of one misbehaved student who will not admit to throwing the paper airplane: Saddam’s fabricated weapon of mass destruction. Indeed the effects of implementing a blockade in trade and investment regarding Iraq, debilitated society in that at least 500,000 Iraqi children died since they had no access to medical services or suffered from malnutrition. I compiled a horrifying list of other statistics, which I will not enumerate here at this time because it deserves a separate book. The Iraqi sanctions regime, ironically, came to an end with the 2003 invasion to remove Saddam Hussein for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with human rights or the efficacy of economic sanctions.

Flash forward to the example of Syria, where the death toll since March protests has risen to 5,000. In an act of civil disobedience, Syrian shopkeepers closed theirs stores in Homs, region of Idlib along Turkish border, and parts of the Southern Daraa province. Many schools joined the strike by closing in what has been referred to as “Strike for Dignity”. At the same time, essential goods stores and pharmacies remained open. However, threats of violence to shopkeepers and break-ins by Assad loyalists attempted to interrupt the strike. According to an Al-Arabiya interview, “..the Hama governor threatened to seal off the stores in the city and forces threatened to set these stores on fire,” Ali Hassan, spokesman for the Turkish-formed Syrian Revolution Council, an opposition group.

Iraq and Syria differ in some aspects regarding the economic sanctions. Initially, in Iraq’s case, the proponents for implementing sanctions argued that the middle class would respond to the debilitating effects by removing its dictator. The costs of war or military intervention would be avoided. However, the Iraqi sanctions plan backfired. Ultimately, the US conducted a military operation to remove Saddam because the Iraqi opposition had been weakened, either by the sanctions or the decision to migrate.

In contrast, economic sanctions have galvanized some segments of Syria in that they have expanded their civil disobedience to include the strategy that could not take root in Iraq: business protest. Small businessmen shut down stores, but we have not seen the civil disobedience emerge in Damascus, the largest city and center of Syrian trade.

From a top-down approach, the Syrian regime has not learned from its Iraqi neighbor’s experience: Iraq’s authoritarian rule under Saddam Hussein throughout the 80s and 90s presents a variety of lessons learned. Generally:
1) gorging civil society incites violence;
2) international sanctions are actually very effective to a fault;
3) Gulf countries’ leadership remain reticent even when they decide to no longer trade with targeted country; and
4) specifically, economic sanctions rely on the middle class to organize swiftly and implement boycotts because the time horizon of long sanctions period works against their organizing interests while alienating civil society and hurting households.

Certainly, there are many other lessons learned. Economic sanctions require citizens to behave as dissatisfied consumers AND act like highly-organized citizens–like a union boycott.

Overall, the macro-economic picture of Syria looks bleak as any economic sanctions regime has exemplified. Of course Syrian regime leaders say otherwise: Finance Minister Mohammad Al-Jleilati argues that Syria regime expects growth of 1 percent, according to Businessweek magazine. Looking at Iraq, it will take several generations for Syria to rebuild its economy, civil society, and it investor confidence–civil war or not. At the very least, because of the growing civil disobedience, the Syrian people will not have to rebuild its path towards dignity. When it comes to revolution, change come from within, as we had HOPED to see with Iraq, and as we hope to see with Syria.

Note: For a more exhaustive list of statistics regarding the social and human costs of economic sanctions on Iraq, please view the PBS Frontline coverage.

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December 11, 2011

Drone Capture, Dismissing Diplomats, UN Report on Nuclear Activity…

There is an economic side to Iran as well…

According to the New York Times, Iran’s subsidies regime, introduced to ensure a fair distribution of limited goods during the Iran-Iraq war, has placed enormous strains on the country’s finances, with energy subsidies alone costing $114 billion a year. That coupled with gasoline shortages stemming from international sanctions prompted the government of Mr. Ahmadinejad to take a step that his predecessors have avoided for fear of the potentially high political costs: ending selected subsidies….continued

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December 7, 2011

International Day of Solidarity With the Palestinian People

By: Mehrunisa Qayyum

Washington, DC – On Thursday, December 1st, The General Delegation of the PLO to the United States held “International Day of Solidarity With the Palestinian People” hosted by Ambassador Maen Rasheed Areikat and his wife. Although the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural organization admitted Palestine as a U.N. member state, the United States responded by not paying 60 million dollars to the agency last month.

The event commemorated what the U.N. General Assembly acknowledged thirty-four years ago: calling for the annual observance of November 29th as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people. (Prior to that in 1947, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II), also known as the Partition Resolution.) Following this tradition, the US PLO Delegation coordinated a photography exhibit, an Oud performance, and displayed a collection of traditional handicrafts as Ambassador Areikat recognized Peace & Justice Awardees.

Recognition of Palestinian culture and identity was not limited to those of Palestinian descent. Moreover, recognition of Palestinian culture did not mean framing Palestinian identity as only a a series of challenges in asserting identity. In particular, Julian Schnabel, a Jewish-American and Academy Award Nominee, earned one of the Peace & Justice Awards. Other Peace & Justice Awardees included Rula Jebreal, author & screenplay writer of the acclaimed novel and film Miral; and Yousef Khanfar, an award winning author and photographer of Palestinian descent. Miral received criticism from some groups who challenged the narrative. Criticism dismissed the following facts: 1) the film was based on autobiography; and 2) film-makers included proud Jewish-Americans.

Aside from Palestine’s rich culture, and efforts to reassert its identity, the World Bank has also recognized the Palestinian National Authority’s push for state-building programs. According to an April report, “if the Palestinian Authority maintains its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services, it is well-positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future.” The report must have noted a few of the of economic and public financial developments that contributed to these findings, such as:
1) Net lending, as a percentage of GDP, declined from 11 percent in 2007 to 3.4 percent in 2010.
2) Net public revenues, as a percentage of GDP, increased from 25 percent in 2007 to 28 percent in 2010.
3) Established a single accounting system through the budget entities and electronically connected them to the Ministry of Finance.
4) 18 percent rise in the volume of foreign investment in Palestine.
5) Organized two investment conferences in Bethlehem in 2008 and 2010 attend by global investors.

Note: Numbers and figures from Palestinian National Development Plan 2011-2013; Building Palestine: Achievements and Challenges. Report of the Palestinian National Authority to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, April 13, 2011.

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December 5, 2011

Poll of the week: 12/5/11



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November 28, 2011

PITAPOLICY Observations: US Senate Holds “Women and the Arab Spring” Hearing

By: Mehrunisa Qayyum

Note: On Wednesday, November 2nd, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations subcommittee on “International Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, Women’s Global Issues held a hearing to discuss the role of women in the Arab Spring and evaluate current efforts of US support. PITAPOLICY is happy to share its observations and welcomes comments and counterarguments responding to this month’s PITAPOLICY Observations.

The US Emphasizes Female Social Entrepreneurs Over Business Entrepreneurs
Nobel laureate, Tawakkul Karman, represents how arab women aspire to lead in social entrepreneurial ventures. The Arab Spring has gained momentum because of women leaders, as observers and other Arab women entrepreneurs attest to as well. Even if Rubin’s reasoning for recognizing Karman is an attempt to “assuage concerns about women’s fate” politically, what about assuaging concerns about women’s fate economically? On November 2nd, Manal Omar, US Institute for Peace Director of Iraq, Iran, and North Africa; Mahnaz Afkhami, Former Minister of Women’s Affairs in Iran; each attested to the organizational potential of Arab female leaders in front of the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Operations & Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and the Global Women’s Issues. The hearing follows a trend of other powerhouses interest in examining the role of Arab women activists and those spearheading civic engagement–also nicknamed “social entrepreneurs.”

The American public and non-profit sectors continue to assert their watchdog role regarding Arab women’s issues. Similarly, the larger global organizations, persistently address women’s issues via social entrepreneurial opportunities. For example, Amnesty International and over 37 women’s and human rights entities, organized under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), submitted testimony calling for support of Arab women.

The government voice was not far behind: Ambassador Melanne Verveer for Global Women’s Issues asserted, “The empowerment of women is inextricably linked to the potential of nations to generate economic growth and sustainable democracy” Tamara Wittes, Deputy Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions. The hearing highlights how the public sector is reviewing women’s social and civil rights and exploring venues for public space. However, the civic engagement discussions overshadow two elements: 1) the technical outlets and challenges for nascent businesses to access public sector funds in transitional Arab economies; and 2) the role of the private sector in supporting Arab female business entrepreneurs. Just because the political rights of women are under scrutiny for electoral participation does not mean that political rights for women in accessing financial and social capital are safeguarded.

Leading in Development Indicators Is Not Enough to Leverage Female Entrepreneurs: Pitfalls of “Top Movers” Status
Earlier in June 2011, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization reviewed the role of women, in not just the Arab Spring context, but in the nation’s Human Development Index by citing its 2002 Arab Human Development Report’s findings:
“…lack of independence for women among the three main factors holding Arab countries back from regaining the heights of world rankings for dialogue, education and culture…”
Arab countries reported higher than average HDIs compared to developing nations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1970, at least five Arab nations demonstrated remarkable improvements in terms of attaining “top movers” status, according to UN analysis. As recently as 2010, Oman ranked first out of 135 countries, followed by Saudi Arabia (5th), Tunisia (7th), Algeria (9th) and Morocco (10th).

“Top Mover” status would presume that women are included in that progress. However, upon further scrutiny, Arab nations’ HDIs composite score did not reflect the missed opportunities for Arab women in civic engagement or employment in the private sector. Take a resource-rich, educated Arab nation that is not classified as a “country in transition”, such as Oman. Oman also ranked first as a “top mover” but does not represent the bulk of Arab female entrepreneurs–in social innovation or business. For example, Sharifa Albarami, a former government employee in Oman, spearheads AMIDEAST’s training center. AMIDEAST is an American nonprofit focusing on the MENA region. Albarami emphasizes that many Gulf Cooperation Council women are educated but linking the education with opportunities to innovate in enterprise is a MENA challenge–not just particular to the(GCC) nations. Specifically Barami articulates, “First let’s establish entrepreneurship as an industry. And cultivate SMEs in Oman and the GCC.”

On the other hand, Omar’s and the Women’s Learning Partnership’s Congressional statements pinpoint the positive development among Arab women engagement in social entrepreneurship. As Omar elucidated, one of the more “conservative” cities in Libya, Benghazi, where 40 percent of its lawyers are female. Based on their testimonies, one may forecast that increasing female social entrepreneurship may be promising in Libya and Tunisia–and may be followed by increasing business entrepreneurship.

Omar offered the Libyan case study from her USIP work to identify civic leaders and women who utilize social capital to lead. Omar identified Libyan women like Najla Elmangoush and Amina Mogherbi who founded a humanitarian organization during the time of conflict to effectively provide aid to inter ally displace persons. If Libyan women, like Najla Elmangoush, could lead the Public Engagement Unit to liaise between the National Transitional Council and civil society organizations, then the public space might have room for Arab women to advance in other entrepreneurial roles, including opening small businesses and, hopefully, leading larger ones.

What would jumpstart female entrepreneurship in the Arab world? OpenDemocracy writers, Foulath Hadid & Mishana Hosseinioun argue that the middle class operated as important “agents of change” in the backdrop of the Arab Spring. Considering Hadid’s and Hosseinioun’s analysis, the middle class includes both business and social entrepreneurs. Perhaps, the middle class that jumpstarted Arab Spring activities through women’s social entrepreneurial efforts will lead to jumpstarting the business entrepreneurial efforts.

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November 23, 2011

openDemocracy: I’m Not Commitment Phobic; I Got Engaged!

Note: Originally posted on openDemocracy.net, which is an E-zine and discussion forum offering news and opinion articles from established academics and journalists covering current issues in world …

 

Not Commitment Phobic: I Got Engaged

One campaigner told me at a campaign fundraiser for his candidate “If American Muslims, like you participated in campaigns or voted, then Islamophobic candidates would not make so much headway.”   The campaigner is right in some idealistic, inclusive way.  But the problem is: this is the long-term strategy.  I want a short to mid-term strategy to engage politically—just like any business must have one.  

I am not commitment phobic. I got engaged.  I served as the interim-Director for a political action committee, Muslim Democrats.  Its founder, Abdul Malik Mujahid, followed the lessons learned from other minority groups by establishing a PAC.  Meanwhile, many American Muslim organizations continue to “educate” rather than lobby.  But advocacy is not enough when concerted, targeted efforts must go beyond snazzy press releases and social media campaigns.  Variety in organizational strategy is key.  In particular, a variety in TYPES of organizations is key.

In 2009, Rahm Emanuel vacated his seat. I rallied as a “Minority Liaison” to encourage retirees and working people to participate in the 5th District Democratic primary.  I remember changing my name from Mehrunisa to “Mary” on the phone just so that potential voters would not hang up the phone on me before I read my call script.

As an American looking towards the primaries, I realize that I need to commit to a party.  Voting in the 2012 election is too little too late because acting as minority voice is all about the primaries.  However, I am less likely to be committed to a political party because every four years the parties tend to veer more towards centrist politics.

Also, I am also less likely to vote because the recent Gallup study showed that American Muslims are the least ‘politically engaged’ of all its religious counterparts in part because they are the youngest.  Coupled with the fact that I am also under 35, I am also less likely to take off time to vote.

Digging deeper: even if I do make it to the primary polls, I am supposed to be less likely to participate in the Republican primary—not just because of my age—but because my minority background tends not to register as Republican.

Two observations challenge this erroneous prediction.  First, as an observant American Muslim, I participate politically more than my fellow American Muslims who self-reported that they are not as observant.  Ironically, according to a Dartmouth study, though, I should be more likely to vote ‘Republican’ because of my strong affiliation with faith and other “conservative” tendencies, as reported by Gallup’s 2011 study.

Second, election junkies would offer a fair counterpoint: successful, assimilated communities donate to both campaigns so that their interests are always aligned with a winner.  Look at the Latin Americans as well as the Jewish Americans.

I’m confused: then why isn’t the Republican party trying to appeal to Muslim American voters—especially since we tend to be younger, the very age range the GOP is disconnected with as we saw in the 2008 election? Continued on openDemocracy.net  

 

 

 

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November 19, 2011

Ambassador Hassouna in Washington, DC

By: Mehrunisa Qayyum

Note: Original piece published by Aslan Media Group.

Supra-national bodies tend to get bogged down in political discussions and controversies. That has certainly been the case with the League of Arab States, which represents the diverse political, social, and economic interests of twenty-two nation-states.

 

The League is routinely criticized as ineffectual and unimportant on the international stage. Yet it has nevertheless received greater attention lately because of the Arab Spring, the recent bid for Palestinian statehood at the UN, Tunisia’s October elections, and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, one could argue that the League has never been more important than in 2011….(click here to read more)

 

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November 9, 2011

Carnegie Asks: “Will Economic Difficulties Derail the Economic Spring?”-Part 1

By: Mehrunisa Qayyum

Washington, DC- On Monday, November 7th, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Twitter handle: CarnegieEndow) asked the question: Will economic difficulties derail the Arab Spring? Uri Dahash moderated an economic discussion that snowballed into a political analysis of gains and losses. Panelists included: 1) Catherine Freund, Chief Economist of the MENA region at the World Bank, 2) Masood Ahmed, Director of the Middle East & Central Asia Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 3) Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, & Agricultural Affairs, and 4) Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate of Carnegie’s Middle East Program. As Dadush further broke down the discussion by asking, “Politically, I’d like to understand: are transitional countries ready to be helped, do they want to receive (foreign aid/assistance)?” I could not help by following up with: do we have any experts that can dig deeper into the political culture analysis if we’re going to revert back to viewing through the political lens?

Will the Economic Difficulties Derail the Arab Spring?
In summary, most of the panelists offered a “no”, with caveats–as economists generally do. As Dr. Freund elaborated, the issue is not so much about the economics as it is the political and security concerns and cited the country example of Angola.

Under Secretary Hormats and Dr. Ahmed concurred, by offering some economic policy advice that essentially emphasizes the GCC nations and G-8 nations to support the economic transition with aid and assistance with the hope that this will EASE the political transition in parallel. In particular, other nations may assist by helping to stabilize the financial situation in Egypt, Tunisia–and hopefully Syria, advance trade opportunities, and provide economic assistance. However, Marina Ottaway expressed concern with the exact question as it presumes that the Arab Spring is supposed to follow a “pre-determined track that can experience derailment”–in essence, economics plays a significant role in the mid to long-term fates of countries in transition. Ottaway reasoned that some social problems will be addressed through economic reforms, but the degree to which social problems resolve afterwards will determine how the political transition facilitates further participation.

Even in the Short-Term, Economics Does Weigh-In…
The consensus argued that the economic difficulties will not derail the Arab Spring in part because the uprisings have noted corruption. However, Freund did elucidate the macro-economic indicators that do raise concern for countries in transition. For example,

⁃ Tourism dropped about 40% in Tunisia and Egypt;
⁃ Consumption is deteriorating;
⁃ Many countries have expanded civil service, raised wages, and keep the subsidies;
– Foreign Direct Investment is down; and
– Unemployment is still in double digits despite transitional reforms.

Furthermore, previous systems worked in an environment socially and economically many recognize that this cannot be sustained. Given these economic issues, Dadush probed further by asking: Can the World Bank do more, e.g. give money, although countries like Libya have Sovereign Wealth Fund to support transition? Freund and Hormats generally referenced the positive historical examples of Europe post WW II and the Eastern European countries transitioning in the 1990s. Essentially both timeframes recognized that political and economic reforms moved best together. Nonetheless, Freund noted how the global economy was much healthier in the more recent case of Eastern Europe–and it didn’t hurt that ascension into the European Union and NATO provided “fresh carrots” to incentivize various reforms regarding governance, participation, and overall redressing corruption charges.

On that note, Ahmed proposed a regional trade affiliation–and the more interesting question of when could the international community expect to see this. Since many of the oil-importing and oil-exporting regions offer little comparative advantage over one another, a free trade zone provides other benefits. Ironically, a regional trade entity– accompanied by various free trade zones for Arab countries (or the larger MENA region)–could serve as more a signal to foreign investors that the environment can support investment without as much bureaucracy.

Given the policy recommendations, Egypt might reconsider international aid or accepting an IMF loan. However, the terms of accepting the packages would have to acknowledge that conditionalized aid operates much more differently when it’s not the binary world circa “Cold War era” or the transitional countries are not looking to obtain membership with any economic cliques…

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November 4, 2011

Meet Syria’s Opposition

By: Randa Slim (Randa Slim is an adjunct research fellow at the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation and a scholar at the Middle East Institute. You can follow her commentary on Middle East affairs @rmslim.)

Source: Foreign Policy Magazine Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Seven months into the uprisings, the Syrian opposition has yet to develop a united voice and platform. Unless these disparate groups unite and present a credible and viable alternative to the Assad regime, both Syria’s fearful majority and the international community will find it difficult to effectively push for meaningful change in Damascus.

The divisions among the Syrian opposition groups remain daunting, despite prodding from abroad and some progress toward unification. The Syrian National Council (SNC), recently formed in Istanbul, Turkey, remains a work-in-progress. The Damascus-based National Coordination Committee (NCC) is at odds with the SNC. The organizations disagree on two of the most urgently contested issues: dialogue with the regime and foreign intervention. Meanwhile, youth activists are divided among three national coalitions. The military defectors formerly divided between the Free Officers Corps and the Free Syrian Army have coalesced under one organizational umbrella, but according to officials in both the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army, there are no formal communication channels yet between the two entities.

This fragmentation and disunity poses a formidable challenge. It makes it difficult to assess who is representing whom, the level of public support each enjoys among Syrians, and the role each is playing in the protest movement. While it is impossible to know which side commands a majority, a critical mass of Syrians has clearly opted for regime change. In this quest, they are laying their lives on the line. The challenge is whether the different leadership centers in the opposition could overcome their differences and coalesce under a unified organizational umbrella akin to Libya’s Transitional National Council…To continue reading the article, click here.

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